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ABSTRACT
This paper explores whether lobbies slow down technology diffusion. To answer this question, we
exploit the differential effect of various institutional attributes that should affect the costs of erecting
barriers when the new technology has a technologically close predecessor but not otherwise. We implement
this test in a unique dataset compiled by us that covers the diffusion of 20 technologies for 23 countries
over the past two centuries. We find that each of the relevant institutional variables that affect the costs
of erecting barriers has a significantly larger effect on the diffusion of technologies with a competing
predecessor technology than when no such a technology exists. These effects are quantitatively important.
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bart.hobijn@ny.frb.orgCross-country diﬀerences in the degree of adoption of technologies are enormous (Comin, Hobijn
and Rovito [2006]). Indeed, they are so large that have been pointed as the main factor causing the
large cross-country diﬀerences in income per capita (Hsieh and Klenow [2003], for example). The
fundamental question for growth theorists is what frictions generate these cross-country diﬀerences
in technology adoption. In this paper we assess the role of one such friction on the adoption of
new technologies. Namely, the political barriers erected as a result of the lobbying eﬀorts of the
producers of incumbent technologies.
Political barriers have long been believed to be an important deterrent to technology diﬀusion.
Until now, however, this belief has only been founded in a few anecdotes.1 The lack of a systematic
eﬀort to prove this belief is the consequence of three diﬃculties. First, it is very hard to obtain direct
measures of political barriers. Second, indirect measures of barriers are problematic because they
typically are endogenous and either have independent eﬀects on income per capita or are correlated
with other variables that aﬀect a country’s development. Third, to explore the eﬀects of lobbies
on technology adoption, it is necessary to have a comprehensive data set on technology adoption,
which, until recently, did not exist.
In this paper, we identify the eﬀect of lobbies on technology diﬀusion by exploiting the diﬀerent
eﬀect that certain institutions that aﬀect the political cost of erecting barriers have on the diﬀusion
of diﬀerent technologies if lobbies matter but not otherwise. We present this identiﬁcation strategy
in Section 1 in the context of a simple model of lobbying and technology diﬀusion in the spirit
of Parente and Prescott [2000], and Olson [1984]. The argument that motivates our identiﬁcation
strategy has two parts.
First, as shown both theoretically (Myerson [2003], Ferejohn [1986], Persson, Roland and
Tabellini [2000]) and empirically (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman [2002], Persson, Tabellini and
Trebbi [2003] and Besley and Case [1995]), certain institutional attributes aﬀect the political cost
faced by the legislature when raising barriers to the diﬀusion of a new technology. In particular, the
cost lobbies must incur to induce legislators to raise diﬀusion barriers are higher when legislators
are not independent, the judicial system is eﬀe c t i v e ,a n dt h er e g i m ei sd e m o c r a t i ca n dn o n - m i l i t a r y .
Second, the beneﬁts old technology producers enjoy from raising barriers against the diﬀusion of
a new technology depend on certain attributes of the new and old technologies. There are some new
technologies that are so superior to the old technology that, even with political barriers, consumers
prefer the new technology to the old one. In these cases, old technology producers ﬁnd no beneﬁt
1See Mokyr [1990] for examples.
2in lobbying for barriers. Thus, the new technology will diﬀuse quickly regardless of the costs of
lobbying.
Other new technologies do, however, have close predecessor technologies because the productivity
diﬀerential between old and new technologies is relatively small. In these cases, old technology
producers may beneﬁt from barriers to the new technology because in the presence of barriers
consumers may prefer to use the old technology. The speed of diﬀusion of these new technologies
depends, therefore, on the cost of erecting barriers. When it is costly to raise political barriers,
lobbying is unsuccessful, barriers are not raised, and new technologies diﬀuse quickly. Conversely,
when the cost of raising barriers is low, the legislative authority accepts the old technology’s lobbying
bribes and raises barriers that slow down the diﬀusion of the new technology.
It follows from these two premises that, if lobbies are a relevant concern, the speed of diﬀusion of
technologies with technologically close predecessor technologies will be aﬀected by the institutional
attributes that aﬀect the political cost of erecting barriers. These institutional attributes should have
no eﬀect, however, on the lobbying intensity against the diﬀusion of technologies with technologically
distant predecessor technologies. This diﬀerential eﬀect of institutions on the diﬀusion of diﬀerent
technologies is the basis for our identiﬁcation strategy of the eﬀect of lobbies on the speed of diﬀusion
of technologies.
By inferring the eﬀect of lobbies on technology diﬀu s i o ni nt h i sw a y ,w ea v o i dt h ec o m p l e x i t y
of measuring the intensity of lobbying directly.2 In addition, we believe that this approach has
three virtues that help it avoid most of the traditional identiﬁcation problems. First, it focuses
on the details of the mechanism by which lobbying aﬀects technology diﬀusion, thus providing a
stronger test of causality. Second, while it may be relatively easy to think of omitted correlates
of the institutional variables that may have an independent eﬀect on the diﬀusion of technologies,
it is very complicated to ﬁnd reasons why these correlates should have an eﬀect on the group of
technologies with a predecessor technology above and beyond the eﬀect they have on the technologies
without one. Section 3.4 discusses in detail the unlikeliness of biases due to the omission of relevant
variables. Third, reverse causality is probably not an issue because it is hard to argue that the
relatively micro technologies in our sample have an eﬀect on the institutions of a country. Further,
for the eﬀect of technology on the institutional variables to invalidate our identiﬁcation strategy,
2Rajan and Zingales [1998] use a similar strategy to identify the eﬀect of capital markets development on economic
development. One important methodological diﬀerence, though, is that while they have various measures of capital
market development (the exogenous variable in their test), we do not have any direct measure of lobbying intensity.
3it must be relevant above and beyond our controls and must be triggered only by the diﬀusion of
technologies with or without a technological predecessor.3
Section 2 documents the plausibility of our identiﬁcation strategy with two historical case studies:
railroads in China during the second half of the XIXth century and telephones in Japan during the
military regime from 1932-45. These case studies show ﬁrst that, in countries with the institutional
traits that the literature has shown reduce the cost of lobbying, parties with vested interests in close
predecessor technologies engaged in intense lobbying activities resulting in the erection of barriers
against the diﬀusion of new technologies. In countries without these institutional attributes or
where the dominated technologies were not present,4 there are no records of lobbying activities or
diﬀusion barriers. Second, our case studies illustrate how lobbying activities and political barriers
slowed the diﬀusion of the targeted new technology relative to countries without similar lobbying
activities. Further, after a change in the institutional traits that increase the cost of lobbying,
we observe that lobbying disappears and that the diﬀusion of the new technologies with close
predecessor technologies accelerates.
To go beyond the exploration of these case studies, we need an extensive data set on the diﬀusion
of multiple technologies in various countries and, preferably, across many time periods. Fortunately,
our Historical Cross-Country Technology Adoption (HCCTA) data set contains historical data on
the adoption of 20 major technologies over the last 215 years for 23 of the world’s leading industrial
economies.
The results from our analysis suggest a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of lobbying on technology
diﬀusion. In Section 3, we ﬁnd that each of our measures of the institutional attributes that aﬀect
the cost of lobbying, have a larger eﬀect on the diﬀusion of technologies when there is a competing
predecessor technology than in cases where there is no such an incumbent technology. Speciﬁcally,
we ﬁnd that in countries where the legislative authorities have more ﬂexibility, the judicial system
3Of course, there may be other mechanisms by which lobbies aﬀect the diﬀusion of new technologies diﬀerent
from the one we identify in this paper. For example, Acemoglu and Robinson [2000] and [2002] present models
where the elite wants to block the diﬀusion of new technologies in order to preserve its political power. Similarly,
unions may block the diﬀusion of labor saving innovations. (Our data set only contains one such innovation.) Since
our identiﬁcation strategy does not identify these mechanism, our estimates of the eﬀect of lobbies on technology
diﬀusion may in principle be downward biased.
4Canal transportation, the predecessor of railways, was unfeasible in countries without navigable rivers, a require-
ment for this technology. In those countries, then, there was no predecessor to railroads that had a small enough
productivity diﬀerential to eﬀectively lobby against them.
4is not eﬀective, the regime is not very democratic or there is a military regime, new technologies
that can substitute for a technological predecessor diﬀuse more slowly than technologies without
such a predecessor technology. These results are robust. Further, they are not only signiﬁcant, but
also quantitatively important to understanding technology diﬀusion. In particular, the variance
associated to the diﬀerential eﬀect that institutional have on the diﬀusion of technologies with close
predecessors represents over 50 percent of the total variance in technology adoption.5 Section 3.3
discusses in detail the unlikeliness that the estimated diﬀerential eﬀect of the institutions that aﬀect
the cost of lobbying on the adoption of technologies with close predecessors result from a bias due
to the omission of relevant variables. Therefore, we are inclined to conclude that the barriers raised
by lobbies to deter the diﬀusion of new technologies are an important impediment to the diﬀusion
of technologies.
Section 4 concludes by drawing the implications of this analysis for the empirical literature on
the eﬀects of institutions on development.
1 The model
We develop a model to understand under what circumstances lobbies make contributions, and when
these contributions induce the legislative authority to erect barriers to slowdown the diﬀusion of
new technologies. More speciﬁcally, the model highlights the importance of the interaction between
attributes of the new and predecessor technologies and institutional traits that aﬀect the costs of
erecting barriers.6
1.1 Setting
Production- Ar e p r e s e n t a t i v eﬁrm produces output competitively. Up to two technologies are avail-
able for production, the old (o)a n dt h en e w( n). When relevant, the output producer must decide
which technology to use and how many units of the intermediate good that embody the technology
5Cross-country variation in technology adoption is approximately four time slarger than cross-country variation
in income per capita (Comin and Hobijn [2004] and Comin, Hobijn and rovito [2006]).
6In the literature, there are various models of lobbying (Helpman and Grossman [1994], for example) and of
endogenous political barriers to technology diﬀusion (Krusell and Rios-Rull [1996], Acemoglu and Robinson [2000
and 2002] and Acemoglu [2004]). Our identiﬁcation strategy is based on the eﬀects on diﬀusion of the interaction
between the institutional traits of the country and the characteristics of the new and predecessor technologies. We
opt for developing a new, simple model because these interactions have not been studied yet.
5to demand. More formally, output is given by





where Y denotes the number of units of output produced, d measures the technological progress
embodied in the new technology relative to the old one, xo denotes the number of units of old tech-
nology intermediate good used, and xn denotes the number of units of new technology intermediate
good used.
Each intermediate good is produced by one producer. Intermediate goods producers may incur
two diﬀerent types of costs. First, intermediate good producers may make transfers to the legislative
authority in exchange for regulations that aﬀect the marginal cost of producing the new intermediate
good.7 Second, there is a marginal cost of producing intermediate goods, which has two components:
one technological and one associated with the regulations. We make the following assumptions about
the technological component of the marginal cost of producing intermediate goods: (i) initially, the
marginal cost of production is equal to ¯ a for both old and new technologies; (ii) at some point
(made precise below), the producer of the new technology intermediate good learns how to produce
it eﬃciently, and the marginal cost of production for the new technology intermediate good becomes
a
¯
< ¯ a. All costs are indexed in terms of output, which is taken as the numeraire.
Institutions- The legislative authority (L) determines the level of regulation (τ) the producer of
new technology goods faces. There are two possible levels of regulation.8 Heavy regulation increases
the marginal cost of producing new intermediate goods by ¯ τ,while no regulation (i.e. τ =0 )l e a v e s
the marginal cost of new intermediate goods unchanged.
The per period payoﬀ of the legislative institution is the sum of three terms: a private value of
being in power (b), the contributions received (C) and the costs of bending the political constraints
imposed by other institutions (S). The cost of passing regulations and L’s discount rate depend
on the actions taken by L and on the institutional setting. It is costless for L to set τ =0(i.e.
S(0) = 0). The cost of implementing ¯ τ depends on L’s independence. For an independent legislative
authority, the cost is s
¯
, while for a less independent authority the cost of setting τ =¯ τ is ¯ s>s
¯
.
7The model predictions would beunaﬀected if, instead of aﬀecting the marginal cost of production, regulations
aﬀected the ﬁxed cost of entry and this reduced the number of entrants associated with the new technology reducing
the gains from variety associated from using it.
8The feasibility of only two tax rates may be completely general if, as in Acemoglu and Robinson [2000], there is
an informal sector where producers can avoid the sales taxes but operate at lower productivity. ¯ τ would then be the
rate that makes the producer indiﬀerent between operating in the two sectors.
6The decisions taken by the legislative authority also may aﬀect his probability of remaining in
power. We model this eﬀect by making the discount rate a function of the regulations passed by
the legislative authority and of the political regimes. In particular, the discount factor faced by
the legislative authority that implements ¯ τ in a democratic regime is β(¯ τ), which is lower than
the discount factor faced in all other cases and by all other entities in the economy. These are
normalized to 1.9 Below we elaborate more on this interpretation.
Timing- For simplicity, we consider a three-period economy.10 The old technology intermediate
goods arrives in period 1. The old technology intermediate good is produced and the producer
decides whether to make a conditional contribution to the legislative authority. L decides whether
to regulate the production of new technology intermediate goods for next period, (i.e. period 2)
and lastly the random variable that determines whether the legislative authority remains in power
or is replaced is realized.
At the beginning of period 2, the new technology arrives. Period 2 is symmetric to period 1,
with the only diﬀerence that now production and contributi o n sc a nb eu n d e r t a k e nb yb o t ht h eo l d
and new technology producers. At the beginning of period 3, the technological component of the
marginal cost of producing new technology intermediate goods declines to a
¯
. Otherwise, period 3
is identical to period 2.
1.2 Analysis
Each period, the ﬁnal output producer selects the technology that yields higher proﬁts. Let π(x)























< 1, he uses the old technology. This decision rule introduces a Bertrand competition
between the old and new intermediate good producers. The result of this competition is that the
producer that supplies the intermediate goods charges a price equal to the minimum between the
9What will be important for our results is not that the discount factor may be lower in democracies than in
dictatorships, but that the discount factor in democracies is more sensitive to the regulations passed by the legislative
authority.
10None of the results derived in this model hinge on the ﬁnite time horizon.
7monopolist price and the marginal cost of production of the other producer (when he is around).
Empirically, political barriers do not stop new technologies from diﬀusing forever. We ensure









Condition 1 implies that, if both intermediate good producers charge their marginal cost of
production in period 3, the ﬁnal output producer uses the new technology even in the presence of
heavy regulations on the production of new intermediate goods. Given this outcome at period 3, we
can proceed solving for the political contributions each producer makes using backwards induction.
In period 3, intermediate good producers make no contribution to L because the game ﬁnishes
in that period. In addition, nobody will make contributions in period 2 because the outcome in the
next period -that the new technology is demanded- occurs regardless of the contributions made.
The technology demanded at time 2 depends on the technological distance between the new and
the old technology, d, and on whether, at period 1, the old technology producer can induce L to set
τ =¯ τ for period 2.
In particular, if d is suﬃciently large, π(n)/π(o) is larger than 1 even in the presence of barriers
to the diﬀusion of the new technology. In this event, the new technology diﬀuses upon arrival. The






Proposition 1 : Suppose Condition 1 and Condition 2 hold. Then new technologies diﬀuse im-
mediately regardless of the institutional setting.
Alternatively, if Condition 2 does not hold (i.e. the new technology is not suﬃciently superior to
the old one), the ﬁnal output producer may demand the old technology in the presence of diﬀusion
barriers. This alone, however, is not suﬃcient to slow the diﬀusion of the new technology. The old
technology lobby must also induce L,a tt =1 , to pass heavy regulations.
L0sp a y o ﬀ if he does not regulate is 3b. Regulating heavily yields L ap a y o ﬀ of b(1 + 2β(¯ τ)) −
S(¯ τ)+C(¯ τ), where C(¯ τ) is the conditional contribution made by the producer of the old technology
intermediate good if τ =¯ τ. Therefore, L sets τ =¯ τ at time 1 if and only if the contribution covers
the costs of passing the regulation and the expected loss from the losing oﬃce. That is, if
C(¯ τ) ≥ 2b(1 − β(¯ τ)) + S(¯ τ). (1)
Is it feasible for the old technology producer to make such a contribution to L? T h em o s th ei s
8willing to contribute to induce heavy regulations are the proﬁts to be made at time 2, since at time
3 the new technology diﬀuses.
If the old technology producer supplies intermediate goods at time 2, he sets a price po2 given
by the following expression
po2 =m i n
©
(¯ a +¯ τ)d
−1/α,¯ a/α
ª
The ﬁrst term in po2 is the price that makes the ﬁnal output producer indiﬀerent between
using the new and the old technology. Whenever this constraint is not binding, the old technology
producer will set the monopolistic price, ¯ a/α.
Given this optimal pricing rule, the proﬁts accrued by the old technology producer in period 2
are
Πo2 =( po2 − ¯ a)(α/po2)
1/(1−α)
Condition 3 and Proposition 2 characterize the environment in which the new technology diﬀuses
slowly.
Condition 3: Πo2 =( po2 − ¯ a)(α/po2)1/(1−α) ≥ 2b(1 − β(¯ τ)) + S(¯ τ).
Proposition 2 : Suppose that Condition 2 does not hold and that Conditions 1 and 3 hold. Then,
new technologies diﬀu s es l o w l y( i . e .t h e yd i ﬀuse in period 3).
Intuitively, since only the old technology producer is around at t =1 , it can take advantage of
this incumbency advantage to bribe L to raise barriers to the adoption of the new technology when
it arrives at period 2. Condition 3 ensures the feasibility of inducing L to regulate. Since Condition
2d o e sn o th o l d ,t h eﬁnal output producer prefers the old technology when the new technology is
regulated, and therefore the old technology producer keeps the market in period 2.11
1.3 Empirical Implications
Next we use the model predictions to derive the exclusion restrictions that allows us to identify the
importance of lobbying for technology diﬀusion. To this end, note that, for a given Πo2, Condition
3h o l d si fβ(¯ τ) is high and/or S(¯ τ) is small. In other words, it holds when the country’s institutions
11One interesting issue is whether it is possible for the new technology producer to compensate the old technology
producer in exchange for not inducing L to raise barriers against the diﬀusion of the new technology. This arrangement
would increase social welfare, but would be hard to enforce. For a discussion of some of the diﬃculties in enforcing
this kind of contract, see Comin and Hobijn [2005].
9make it easy to lobby L for diﬀusion barriers because heavily regulating the new technology does
not reduce L’s probability of reelection and/or L faces a small static cost of implementing the
regulations. Conversely, when this is not the case, the institutional environment makes it costly to
lobby L, and the new technology diﬀuses quickly.
Note, however, that having an institutional environment that makes it easy to lobby L is a
necessary, but not a suﬃcient condition for the new technology to diﬀuse slowly. In addition, the
new technology must not be too technologically superior to the old one (i.e. Condition 2 must not
hold). When Condition 2 holds, the new technology diﬀuses quickly regardless the institutional
environment.
Table 1: Model Predictions I
Technological attributes → dH i g h dL o w
Institutional attributes ↓
Costly to Lobby Legislature Fast Diﬀusion Fast Diﬀusion
Easy to Lobby Legislature Fast Diﬀusion Slow Diﬀusion
These implications, which are summarized in Table 1, yield the basic identiﬁcation strategy.
Namely, we identify the role of lobbying on technology diﬀusion by exploring the diﬀerential eﬀect
of the institutional attributes that aﬀect the cost of lobbying on the speed of diﬀusion of technologies
with technologically close predecessor technologies (low d) vs. technologies that are very superior
to or have no predecessor technologies (high d).12
There are sources of variation across technologies, other than diﬀerences in d, that also aﬀect
lobbying intensity. One relevant dimension is the elasticity of demand, α, of the old technology.
In Tirole [1988] and Aghion and Howitt [1998], the parameter α has been related to the size of
the sunk costs, F, necessary for a producer (in this case, of the old technology) to begin operating.
Intuitively, a higher F reduces the number of old technology producers and, therefore, the elasticity
of substitution between diﬀerent intermediate goods associated to the old technology. Hence, a
higher sunk cost, F, is equivalent to a smaller α. 13
12Equivalently, we can explore the diﬀerential eﬀect of the institutional attributes on the intensity of adoption of
technologies with close predecessors vs. those without. This type of measures of technology diﬀusion are easier to
obtain in the presence of heterogenity.
13Admittedly, this interpretation requires going beyond the simple model described above, in which only one ﬁrm
produces the intermediate goods associated with a given technology. This interpretation is, however, a natural
extension of the model presented above but, given the empirical character of this paper, we do not pursue it here.
10For simplicity, we restrict our exploration to the region of po2 where the price charged by the old
technology producer is not constrained by the presence of a new intermediate good producer. When
α tends to 1, the proﬁts accrued by the old technology producer in period 2, Πo2, tend to zero, and
Condition 3 never holds because the old technology producer does not have suﬃcient rents to induce
L to raise barriers. For lower values of α, whether Condition 3 holds depends on the institutions
and on d. In particular, for intermediate values of d and F, new technologies diﬀuse slowly only
if the existing institutions make it easy to lobby the legislature. If institutions make it costly to
lobby L, the new technology diﬀuses quickly for intermediate values of d and F. When, instead,
new technologies have a relative productivity, d, that is very large or when the production of old
technology intermediate good involves very small sunk costs, F, new technologies diﬀuse quickly
regardless of the country’s institutional setting.
Table 2: Model Predictions II
Technological attributes → dH i g ho rFs m a l l dL o wa n dFL a r g e
Institutional attributes ↓
Costly to Lobby Legislature Fast Diﬀusion Fast Diﬀusion
Easy to Lobby Legislature Fast Diﬀusion Slow Diﬀusion
Table 2 summarizes these conclusions, which are the basis for our second identiﬁcation strategy.
Namely, we identify the eﬀect of lobbies on technology diﬀusion by estimating the diﬀerential eﬀect
of the institutions that aﬀect the cost of lobbying on the speed of diﬀusion of technologies with and
without high d and small F.
Implementing these identiﬁcation strategies requires (i) classifying technologies according to the
technological distance and size of sunk costs involved in producing the predecessor technology and
(ii) a list of institutions that aﬀect the cost of lobbying the legislature. First, we will discuss the set
of institutions that determine the cost of lobbying. The classiﬁcation of technologies is discussed in
the next section, where we present the data.
We consider four institutional traits that aﬀect the costs of lobbying the legislature for barri-
ers. First, the independence of legislators to pass regulations: Legislators with a high degree of
independence do not have to respond to superior entities when passing regulations. As a result,
they will face lower static costs (S(¯ τ)) of erecting barriers. Second, the eﬀectiveness of the judicial
system: Accepting conditional contributions (i.e. bribes) is illegal in most countries, including all
11the countries in our data set. An eﬀective judiciary that can detect, judge and sentence such viola-
tions makes it more costly for the legislature to accept bribes. As a result, L0s static cost of raising
barriers (S(¯ τ)) increases with the eﬀectiveness of the judiciary.
Third, the degree of democracy: A growing body of research has observed that electoral pressure
aligns oﬃcials’ incentives with public interest. The theoretical strand of the literature has identiﬁed,
three aspects of the electoral system that aﬀect the degree of electoral competition oﬃcials face and
should aﬀect their incentives to extract political rents. These are (i) the ballot structure, (ii)
the district magnitude and (iii) the electoral formula. With regard to (i), some electoral systems
make incumbents individually accountable to the voters, while others elect politicians from party
lists. A party-list system weakens individual incentives for good behavior because it creates free-
rider problems and makes chains of delegation more indirect (because they now go from voters
to parties to politicians). As for (ii), fewer legislators elected in a typical electoral district (low
district magnitude) may increase corruption because it raises barriers to entry (Myerson [1993]).
A smaller number of parties (or ideological types) present themselves at the polls, and voters
have less opportunity to oust corrupt politicians or parties (Ferejohn [1986], Persson, Roland and
Tabellini [2000], Adsera, Boix and Payne [2003]). When it comes to (iii), the electoral formula may
also shape rent extraction through the sensitivity of election outcomes to incumbent performance.
Since incumbents may be more severely punished under plurality rule than under proportional
representation (PR), the former may be more eﬀective in deterring corruption (Persson and Tabellini
[2000, ch. 9], Lijphart [1994, 1999] and Powell [2000]). On the empirical side, Kunicova and Rose-
Ackerman [2002] ﬁnd that, in a large cross-section of countries, closed-list systems are associated
with more corruption. Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi [2003] also ﬁnd that the higher electoral
pressure that comes from each of the mechanisms described previously is associated with lower
corruption. Finally, Besley and Case [1995] show that term limits in gubernatorial elections in
US states are associated with higher taxes and higher government spending, compared with states
without binding limits. It is then natural to think that the observed eﬀectiveness of the electoral
pressure in preventing oﬃcials from extracting political rents follows from the higher probability
that, in more democratic societies, a legislator that is detected accepting conditional contributions
is not reelected for the next term. Or, in terms of the parameters in our model, that β(¯ τ) is lower
in societies with higher democracy scores.
Fourth, by the same token, the horizon of the legislative authority in military regimes is more
independent of the regulations passed than in civil regimes. Therefore, the ﬁnal institutional trait
12that aﬀects the dynamic cost of lobbying the legislature is whether the regime is military or civilian.
In the empirical section, we present various measures of these four institutional traits that, as
we have argued, aﬀect the cost of lobbying the legislature. Before going into the details of the data,
we ﬁnd it instructive to illustrate our identiﬁcation strategy with a few historical examples.
2 Case studies
Although this paper aims for a general understanding of the eﬀect of lobbies on technology diﬀusion,
anecdotal evidence is still useful to illustrate the workings of our identiﬁcation strategy. With this
goal in mind, we explore two historical examples: the diﬀusion of railroads in China during the
second half of the XIXth century and the diﬀusion of telephones in Japan during the military
regime from 1932-45.
Railroads in China
D u r i n gt h es e c o n dh a l fo ft h eX I X th century, China was autocratically ruled by the imperial
family. The degree of democracy as measured by the Polity index was 1 on a scale from 0 to 10, 10
being the most democratic.
A tt h et i m e ,n a v i g a b l er i v e r sw e r eu s e dt ot r a n s p o r tc o a lf r o mt h em i n e st ot h eh a r b o r s .T h e
introduction of railways could have improved the productivity of waterways (Kinder [1891]) but,
as Fogel [1964] has shown, the productivity gain from railroads when canals are feasible, as in this
case, is not overwhelming. These technological and institutional characteristics place railroads in
China in the bottom right cell of Table 1. According to our model, the combination of the moderate
gap between railways and canals and the lack of a democratic regime increase the probability of
successful lobbying eﬀorts from agents with vested interests in river transportation. As a result, we
expect to observe a slow diﬀusion of railroads in China, a prediction that the historical evidence
supports.
Several groups had vested interests in delaying the diﬀusion of railroads in China, including junk
owners and oﬃcials who proﬁted from the rice tribute being carried by boat through the canals.
Brown and Wright [1981] and Kinder [1891] document some of the actions, including lobbying, that
these interest groups undertook and the resulting barriers. The barriers include blowing up bridges
(Kinder [1891]), not granting the permits to construct the railroads through good terrain or not
granting the permits at all, and forcing the use of domestic materials and parts in the construction
of the railroads, locomotives and cars. As we demonstrate below, these political actions slowed
13the diﬀusion of railroads in China, despite the fact that the terrain and geography were ideal for
railroads (Kinder [1891]).
Our model predicts that in countries where there is no close substitute for the new technology,
lobbying eﬀorts (if they occur at all) should be unsuccessful. As a result, the new technology -
railroads, in this case- should diﬀuse quickly. We investigate next the empirical validity of these
predictions in the cases of Spain, Portugal and Japan — all countries without navigable rivers.
The regimes that governed these countries for all or part of the second half of the XIXth century
were almost as autocratic as China’s.14 Despite this institutional context, however, there were very
few political barriers to the diﬀusion of railroads in Portugal, Japan and Spain. In particular, Men-
doza [1989] documents the special prerogatives granted to railroad constructors before 1860, which
included duty-free import of materials, tools and equipment, the purchase of land in favorable terms
and ﬁscal tax breaks. In Japan, companies that built railroads also enjoyed a favorable treatment,
including exemption from land taxes on the land used in connection with the railroad, access to
loans and, for some companies, a government guarantee of a return on the capital subscribed until
1906 of 8 per cent (Ike [1955]). In addition, the government was directly engaged in the construction
of some of the railways. By 1885, over 60 percent of the railroad system had been constructed by
the government. This share was still over 25 percent by 1900. The government support to railroads
resulted in a relatively fast diﬀusion of railroads in the Iberian Peninsula and in Japan.
Figure 1 displays the kilometers of railroads constructed between 1850 and 1900.15 The amount
of railway in Spain, Portugal and Japan was muchl a r g e rt h a ni nC h i n a ,d e s p i t et h ef a c tt h a t
China’s area is about 19 times Spain’s, about one hundred times Portugal’s and about twenty-ﬁve
times Japan’s. By the end of the XIXth century China had 829 Km of railway, while Portugal had
almost three times that, and Spain had 13 times that. Hence, the presence of a non-democratic
regime is not suﬃcient to slow the diﬀusion of railroads. In addition, the new technology, railroads,
must also have a close predecessor technology - in this case, canals.
The presence of institutions that make it easy to lobby is, however, a necessary condition for
the slow diﬀusion of railroads. In countries without such institutions, lobbying eﬀorts will be
14The average Polity score for democracy in Portugal between 1850 and 1899 was 1 as in China. In Spain, the
regimes that governed during the 1850-75 period also had a low democracy score (1 most of the time), but Alfonso
XII’s regime brought important democratic reforms in 1875. This is reﬂected in the Polity score which reaches a
value of 4 by 1879 and oscillates between 5 and 7 until the end of the century. In Japan, the average polity score
between 1850 and 1857 was 0, then it quickly increased to 5 in 1867 and remained there until 1900.
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Figure 1: Kilometers of Railways
ineﬀective, and railroads shall diﬀuse quickly, regardless of the length of their waterways. Belgium
and Switzerland illustrate this prediction.
By 1850, Belgium and Switzerland were two of the most democratic countries in Europe.16
Belgium and Switzerland diﬀered signiﬁcantly, however, in their use of waterways. Belgium was
ahead of most European countries in the length of its canals. In contrast, Switzerland had few
canals as its special geography prevented the use of waterways for transportation other than to
cross lakes and to connect a few cities in the borders, such as Basel or Geneve, with the contiguous
countries.
Despite the geographical constraints faced by Switzerland, railroad construction proceeded at a
fast pace in both countries.17 Figure 1 illustrates this.
Our empirical strategy for identifying the role of lobbying on technology diﬀusion exploits the
diﬀerential eﬀects of institutions across technologies with and without close predecessors. In the
case of railroads, that means that the diﬀerential eﬀect of having a non-democratic regime on the
16The Polity score in Belgium was 7 from 1952 until the end of the century and in Switzerland it was 10.
17Spain between 1879 and 1900 is another example of a country without canals, with a good Polity score and with
a relatively high level of diﬀusion of railroads.
15speed of diﬀusion of railroads in those countries with canals vs. those without canals is attributed
to the lobbying eﬀorts of agents with vested interests in the utilization of canals. That is, after
controlling for other determinants of the speed of diﬀusion of new technologies, the diﬀerence in
the gap between the length of railways in Belgium and China and the gap between the length of
railways in Switzerland and Portugal is attributed to the barriers raised by lobbies to the diﬀusion
o fr a i l r o a d si nC h i n a .A si sa p p a r e n tf r o mF i g u r e1 ,t h ei n f e r r e de ﬀect of lobbies on the diﬀusion
of railroads is very signiﬁcant.18
Japan 1932-45
Japan during the 1930s is another historical case that we use to illustrate our empirical strategy.
From 1932 to 1945, Japan’s government was eﬀectively under military control. The only non-
military personnel who held government positions were the Emperor, who served as Chief of State,
and a few civilians whose services were deemed necessary for successful conduct of government
operations. The instauration of the military hegemony in 1932 coincides with the strengthening of
regulations that made the adoption of modern technologies less proﬁtable. One such regulation was
the Major Industries Control Law, which allowed the government to form a list of “major indus-
tries” at their discretion and curtail the output of producers in those industries. Inclusion in the
list usually resulted from the eﬀorts of a coalition of established producers with more obsolete tech-
nology (Anchordoguy [2001]). This was the case, for example with cotton spinning and cement.19,20
18Of course, in our data set, the measures of the intensity of adoption of railroads are properly scaled.
19In December 1931, the cotton industry was included among the “Major Industries” under the control Law.
This movement was in response to the demands of the older producers, who operated less eﬃcient equipment. The
application of the Major Industries Control Law lead to a substantial increase in curtailment rates. Further, since the
latter part of 1935, recently installed spindles were subject to higher curtailment rates than older ones. In particular,
the newly installed spindles were classiﬁed in two groups according to whether they had begun to operate between
November 1st, 1932 and October 31st, 1935 or after the latter date. The additional curtailment rate imposed on the
second group was much higher than that imposed on the ﬁrst. In this way, curtailment rates protected ineﬃcient
producers and slowed the diﬀusion of new, more eﬃcient spinning technologies.
20The Cement Federation (Rengokai) was formed in 1924, and its function was to control output by restricting
members from producing at their full capacity. In 1932, the Rengokai’s curtailment rate was raised to 55 percent
when the industry came under the Major Industries Control Law. A few companies with more modern machinery,
such as the Onada and the Oita Companies, protested against the uniform curtailment rates and withdrew from the
cartel in order to expand their capacity. The cartel then appealed to the Government to enforce Article 2 of the
Major Industries Control Law, and the Minister of Commerce and Industry agreed to this in December 1934. With
this decision, the “outsiders” were compelled to accept the cartel’s curtailment rates and to forego expanding their
16Curtailment rates tended to dissuade the adoption of new technologies for two reasons. First, the
return to a new machine declines when a curtailment restriction forces its under-utilization. Second,
curtailment rates for newer vintages were sometimes higher than for older machines.
In addition to curtailment rates, the military government also slowed the diﬀusion of new tech-
nologies by restricting FDI inﬂows. This policy was in part the result of lobbying eﬀorts from
incumbent Japanese producers whose proﬁts were threatened by foreigners supplying newer tech-
nologies (Mason [1992]). As a result, FDI restrictions were more pervasive in sectors with a new
technology and a competing predecessor technology, like communications.
Japan had been importing telegraph and telephone technology since the 1870’s. Domestic pro-
ducers initially just assembled products from imported parts, but they slowly started developing
domestic technology to produce the parts. Domestic technology was initially inferior to imported
technology, so, to accelerate the diﬀusion process, domestic producers merged with subsidiaries of
foreign producers. This was the case with NEC and the overseas subsidiary of Western Electric,
International Western Electric. When the gap between domestic and foreign technology decreased,
domestic producers lobbied for limits on the share of telecommunication companies owned by for-
eigners and for the prohibition of FDI. These barriers brought improvements in newer telecommu-
nication technologies, such as telephones, to a halt. In contrast, they had no eﬀect on the eﬃciency
of mature technologies, such as telegraphs, that had been already mastered by domestic producers.
As a result, the substitution process of telegraphs by telephones was much slower in Japan than in
other economies that did not suﬀer from the barriers raised by a military government in response
to incumbents’ lobbying eﬀorts, such as France. This diﬀerence is depicted in Figures 2 and 3.
The log of telegrams per capita reached a maximum in France by 1920. At this point, the use of
telegrams started a monotonic decline as they were replaced by telephones. In Japan, instead, the
use of telegrams remained very high much longer and, in particular, did not decline at all during
the 1930s.
The evolution of telephones per capita (Figure 3) is the opposite. Right before the instauration
of the military regime in Japan in the early 30s, Japan caught up with France in the number of
telephones per capita. With the new military regime, the gap in telephones per capita between
France and Japan widened again, and it was not closed until 1960.
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Figure 3: (Log of) Telephones per capita
18and Japan to the barriers raised by the military regime in response to the pressure of lobbies.21
After WWII the restrictions on technology importation gradually liberalized (Sekiguchi [1986]
and Odagiri and Goto [1996]). As a result, technologies with close predecessors, such as telephones,
cars and planes, began diﬀusing very quickly in Japan.
3 Empirical exploration
In this section we describe the data used in the empirical analysis. Then we present the econometric
implementation of our identiﬁcation strategy. Finally we present the estimates of the eﬀect of lobbies
on technology diﬀusion and argue in favor of the causal interpretation of the estimates.
3.1 Data and classiﬁcations
To test the predictions of the model we need to collect three types of variables. First we need to
measure the diﬀusion of various technologies in diﬀerent sectors and countries over time. Second,
we need to classify technologies according to if they have a previous competing technology and, if
they do, to the size of the sunk costs necessary to produce the predecessor technology. Finally, we
need to collect information of the institutional setting in each country in our sample.
The information on technology diﬀusion comes from our Historical Cross-Country Technology
Adoption (HCCTA) data set introduced in Comin and Hobijn [2004]. This data set contains his-
torical data on the adoption of 20 major technologies over the last 215 years for 23 of the world’s
leading industrial economies.
Table 3 contains a list of the technologies used in this analysis and a list of the countries that
21A third sector in which we have found evidence of lobbying by producers of an old technology is transportation.
In this case, since railways were partially owned by the government, it was the government itself the one that
beneﬁted from the barriers to the diﬀusion of cars, the new technology. The following quote documents the plans of
the Ministry of Railways in 1930:
“In consequence of the very great increase in recent years in the use of omnibuses and motor trucks in Japan, the
Ministry of Railways is investigating the question of co-ordinating and controlling omnibus and truck services, with
a view to protecting railway services from excessive competition and encouraging motor services useful as feeders of
the railways. The Ministry contemplates using, in its controlled services, omnibuses and trucks built in Japan, and
Bill is now being prepared, for presentation to the next session of the Diet, empowering the Ministry to take over
motor transport services.” (Japan Political and Economic Reports 1926-1985)
19are included in our data set, which is basically the developed OECD economies. The technologies
in our sample belong to seven sectors (i) textiles, (ii) steel, (iii) telecommunication, (iv) mass
communication, (v) information technology, (vi) transportation (rail-, road-, and airways) and (vii)
shipping.
We use ﬁve diﬀerent types of measures for the level of technology adoption. The ﬁrst, used for
textiles and shipping, measures the fraction of capital equipment embodying a particular technol-
ogy. Second, for technologies that are predominantly used in production, like trucks and robots, we
measure capital output ratios. That is, we take the number of equipment units of a particular tech-
nology as a ratio of real GDP. For some production technologies we do not have capital stock data,
but only data on output produced, like ton-kilometers (TKM) of freight transported using various
transportation methods or tons of steel produced using various technologies. For those technologies
we use production to real GDP ratios. Our ﬁnal two measures are used for consumption (rather
than production) technologies. Because of that, they normalize capital stocks and consumption
measures by population rather than real GDP. Capital stocks per capita are used to measure, for
example, passenger cars per capita and mobile phones per capita. Consumption per capita is used
for mail, telegrams, as well as passenger transportation variables.22
Since we are interested in understanding the determinants of the speed of diﬀusion of new
technologies along the transition path, for each technology we are going to use data only until a
certain year, which is determined by one of two criteria. For some technologies, it may correspond
to the point in time at which the distribution of the level of technologies across countries becomes
constant. For other technologies that become dominated by an even newer technology, it corresponds
to the year in which the level of technology starts declining. In either case, the truncation of the
sample for a given technology is the same for all countries.
We classify technologies according to two criteria. First we classify them according to whether or
not they have a previous competing technology. There are two senses in which a new technology may
be very superior to the existing technologies, and thus not have a previous competing technology.
In a vertical sense, a new technology does not have a competing technology if it can conduct the
same tasks as the previous technology, but much more eﬃciently. In a horizontal sense, a new
technology does not have a previous competing technology if it can perform important tasks that
were previously unfeasible.
22Table A2 shows the robustness of our ﬁndings to scaling all technology adoption measures by population rather
than scaling some by population and others by GDP.
20Measuring these relative productivities is not trivial for a variety of reasons. First, the relative
productivity of the new technology will surely vary over time. This is consistent with condition 1 in
our model by which, eventually, new technologies always diﬀuse. To determine whether the relative
productivity is so large that Condition 2 holds, however, we focus on the relative productivities
over a relatively short period (always less than 30 years) after the new technology is ﬁrst invented.
Second, the relative productivity of the new technology may vary across countries and/or across
activities (typing vs. computing for PC’s) or across routes (for transportation technologies). Of
course, it is virtually impossible to take all these dimensions into account. As a result, our estimates
of the relative productivity will be noisy. However, since there is a large dispersion in the observed
relative productivities, we believe that our classiﬁcation of technologies is relatively accurate. To
gain more conﬁdence in the conclusions, we check the robustness of the results to variations in the
few cases where the classiﬁcation is not so clear. All our results are robust to eliminating one by
one the technologies. Hence, the results are not driven by any single technology.
To undertake our classiﬁcation we have searched the historical literature for studies that com-
pare new and old technologies along the relevant dimensions. Appendix 1 discusses the relative
productivities estimates for the various technologies and the references for these studies. Table 4
summarizes these estimates. The second column of this table lists, for each technology, the pre-
decessor technology or technologies. The third column contains estimates of the vertical distance
between the technology and its predecessor/s. These may be the relative speed in conducting a
representative task (e.g. travelling from city A to city B) or, for some technologies, the relative
variable cost of conducting a representative task (e.g. cost of transmitting a one page letter from
city A to city B). Finally, column 4 describes relevant activities that become feasible with the new
technology.
The following brieﬂy summarizes the productivity diﬀerential between the technologies we ana-
lyze and their predecessors. A more thorough description is given in Appendix 1.
Six of the technologies in our sample - Bessemer, electric arc, telegraphs, railroads, PCs and
robots - were signiﬁcantly more productive than their predecessor technologies. Bessemer developed
a system to produce steel in industrial quantities. Prior to Bessemer, steel was produced by the
crucible method, which took 14-15 days to produce 50 pounds of steel. The Bessemer method
produced ﬁve tons of steel in half an hour. This supposes an increase in output per hour of about
half a million. Electric arc furnaces made possible for the ﬁrst time the production of stainless
steel. The telegraph rendered curriers obsolete. It reduced the time to transmit one page of written
21text from Chicago to New York from 10 days to ﬁve minutes, a three-thousand-fold reduction, an it
reduced the cost by a factor of 100. Prior to the railroads, it took between two to four days to travel
the 90 miles that separate New York from Philadelphia, which gave an average speed of just above
two miles per hour. Within a few years of the introduction of railroads, the average speed of railways
was ten times higher than that. Personal computers increased enormously our computing capacity
at a rate that doubled every 18 months after their invention. Industrial robots introduced a great
deal of ﬂexibility into the manufacturing of certain goods, leading to improvements in productivity
by a factor of up to four.
For the rest of technologies in our sample, the technological distance with their predecessors,
though still signiﬁcant, was relatively small. As late as 1914, ring spindles were not faster than mules
spindles. Blast oxygen furnaces were the biggest innovation in steel production since Bessemer, but
they only improved productivity by a factor of 2.5. Telephones reduced the average time spent
dispatching trains, dispatching news and transmitting one page of text by a factor of less than
three. The estimated increase in productivity associated with replacing phones with mobile phones
is only about one third. The introduction of freight trains increased the speed of cargo transportation
by a factor of 2 or 3 with respect to canal transportation. Hence whenever canals were available,
cargo trains did not constitute a radical improvement in transportation. However, in countries
without navigable rivers their impact was enormous. Cars and trucks did not increase the speed
of transportation over trains, although trucks might have reduced the cost of shipping cargo over
short distances by 20 to 30 percent. By 1940, planes had improved traveling speeds by a factor of
no more than four or ﬁve. As late as 1893, steam ships were just 20 percent faster than state of the
art sailing ships.
Radios and TVs deserve a separate analysis. Experiments have shown that advertisement recall
rates are not higher for radios or TVs than for newspapers. However, the two brought image
and sound to the media, and these are important horizontal improvements over newspapers and
magazines. In our analysis, we will experiment by classifying radios and TVs as both revolutionary
and non-revolutionary technologies.
Based on this discussion, the list of technologies that were signiﬁcantly more productive than
previous technologies is Bessemer steel, electric arc furnace steel, telegrams, newspapers, personal
computers, industrial robots, passenger transportation by railroads and, for countries without nav-
igable rivers, cargo transportation by railroads. The group of technologies with a technologically
close predecessor includes ring spindles, steel produced with blast oxygen and with open hearth
22furnaces, telephones, mobile phones, radios, TVs, cars, trucks, passengers and cargo transported by
airplane and in steam and motor shipping.
The second scheme by which we classify technologies recognizes the diﬃculty of lobbying when
the production of the old technology is dispersed. Speciﬁcally, we consider that a technology has a
competing concentrated predecessor if (i) the production of the previous technology requires large
sunk costs and (ii) the productivity gap between new and old technology is small.
Our research, described in Appendix 2, shows large sunk costs were required to begin producing
Bessemer and open hearth steel; to install telegraphs and telephone lines; to construct canals,
railroads and trains; and to begin producing cars, trucks and sail ships. Note that, based on our
ﬁrst classiﬁcation, the productivity gap between these and the subsequent technologies was not
very large. Therefore, the technologies with competing and concentrated predecessor technologies
are open hearth and blast oxygen steel, telephones, mobile phones, trucks, cars, planes, steam and
motor ships and cargo transportation by train wherever canals were available. The predecessors
to all the other technologies in our sample either lag very much behind the productivity of the
new technology or their production required much smaller sunk costs than the technologies just
listed. In particular, the production of mule spindles, newspapers and radios did not require large
sunk costs. Therefore, ring spindles, radios and TVs which were previously classiﬁed as having a
competing predecessor are now classiﬁed as not having a concentrated competing predecessor. The
rest of technologies in the sample did not have a competing predecessor in the ﬁrst classiﬁcation,
and therefore cannot have a concentrated competing predecessor.
Note that, by construction, the two classiﬁcations of technologies are correlated. Since the
correlation between these classiﬁcations is less than perfect (about 75 percent), however, this duality
provides us with a second identiﬁcation scheme to estimate the eﬀect of lobbies on the diﬀusion of
new technologies. In particular, it allows us to check the robustness of the results to the classiﬁcation
of TVs and radios, which, given the horizontal nature of their technological improvements, it is hard
to determine whether they had or not a technologically close predecessor. In addition to using these
two classiﬁcation schemes, we will conduct several robustness checks to make sure our results are
not driven by the classiﬁcation of any single technology.
Finally, we use the following measures of legislative independence, eﬀectiveness of the judiciary,
degree of democracy and degree of military regime.
Legislative independence is measured by the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (also
known as the Banks dataset) by assigning one of four values to a country: (0) indicates that
23no legislature exists. (1) is assigned on three possible bases: ﬁrst, legislative activity may be
essentially of a “rubber stamp” character; second, domestic turmoil may make the implementation
of legislation impossible; third, the eﬀective executive may prevent the legislature from meeting,
or otherwise substantially impede the exercise of its functions. (2) corresponds to a situation in
which the executives power substantially outweighs, but does not completely dominate, that of the
legislature. Finally, (3) is assigned when a signiﬁcant governmental autonomy is possessed by the
legislature, including, typically, substantial authority with regard to taxation and disbursement and
the power to override executive vetoes of legislation. Given the countries and period covered in our
data set, most of the variation in this variable comes from country-periods that are classiﬁed as (2)
rather than (3), which is the mode.
We follow La Porta et al. [1998] and measure the eﬀectiveness of the judiciary with the cross-
country measure compiled by the Business International Corporation. We take the average of the
measures between 1980 and 1983, which is scaled to between zero and ten, with lower scores meaning
lower levels of judicial eﬃciency.
The democracy of a regime comes from Polity IV. This variable measures the general openness of
political institutions. Speciﬁcally, it sums measures of the competitiveness of political participation,
the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and the constraints on the chief executive.
The result is a variable between zero and ten with higher values indicating more democratic regimes.
Finally, we classify regimes between those that are military and those that are not military using
the Banks data set. A military regime is one that is explicitly or implicitly controlled by a military
component of the nation’s population.
For all the variables used in our analysis, we compute ﬁve-year averages and use non-overlapping
data in our regressions. Taking these ﬁve year averages increases the signal-to-noise ratio of our
variables and, a priori, does not reduce much of the relevant variation in the data since both
technology diﬀusion and institutional change are relatively low frequency phenomena. Table 6
contains the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the econometric analysis.
Next we implement our identiﬁcation strategy, present our estimates and discuss their interpre-
tation.
243.2 Results
The basic regression we run has the following form:
yict = α0 + αDit + β1Xct + β2Rct + β3Ii ∗ Rct +  ict. (2)
yict denote our measure of the adoption of technology i in country c at time t. α0 is a constant.
As explained above, we measure diﬀerent technologies using diﬀerent units. Further, as shown in
Comin et al. (2006), technologies follow diﬀerent diﬀusion paths. To control for these diﬀerences in
diﬀusion across technologies we always include in our regressions a full set of time and technology
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects denoted by Dit. T h i si m p l i e st h a t ,e ﬀectively, our dependent variable is the
deviation in the adoption level of each technology i in country c at time t from the average adoption
level in the technology and period across countries. Xct is a set of controls that have been highlighted
in the diﬀusion literature as being important for purely neoclassical reasons. This vector includes
the level of income per capita, various measures of educational enrollment23 and the adoption of
complementary technologies measured by the production of electricity over real GDP.
Rct represents the set of institutional variables that aﬀect the cost of lobbying. These are
legislative ﬂexibility, eﬀectiveness of the judiciary, the democracy index and the military regime
dummy.
The fourth set of regressors in (2), Ii ∗ Rct interacts the institutional variables (Rct) with either
a dummy variable for the technologies that have a competing predecessor technology or a dummy
for the technologies with concentrated and competing predecessors (Ii). β3 is the critical vector of
coeﬃcients for the identiﬁcation of the role of lobbying activity on technology diﬀusion. Speciﬁcally,
if lobbies slow down the diﬀusion of new technologies, we should observe that the eﬀect of institutions
that increase the cost of lobbying on technology diﬀusion is larger for technologies with a competing
incumbent technology than for technologies without one. This implies that β3 should be positive
for institutional variables that increase the cost of lobbying — such as the degree of democracy or
the eﬀectiveness of the judiciary — and negative for variables that decrease the cost of lobbying —
such as the independence of the legislature and the military regime dummy. Finally,  ict is an error
term.
Table 7 reports the ﬁrst set of coeﬃcient estimates from regression (2). Each column corre-
sponds to a diﬀerent regression. In this table we only explore the interactions with the competing
23The enrollment rates in primary and secondary schooling before 1970 are computed by us, for the years after
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Figure 4: Increase in adoption from higher democracy score by technology group
predecessor technology dummy, leaving for Table 8 the regressions based on the interactions with
the concentrated and competing predecessor technology dummy. Column 1 corresponds to a basic
regression with only the vector Xct as a regressor. There we can observe that income per capita,
the primary enrollment and the intensity of electricity production are positively associated with
the level of technology diﬀusion. The positive coeﬃcient for enrollment, however, only holds for
enrollment before 1970.
Rather than including at once the four institutional variables in Rct and the associated interac-
tions with the competing predecessor technology dummy, Ii∗Rct,w eﬁnd it instructive to introduce
them successively.24 Since the comparative statics that motivate the identiﬁcation strategy are valid
“keeping everything else constant”, we delay the interpretation of the results until the column that
includes all four institutional traits.
Column 2 starts with democracy. Democracy is associated with a lower diﬀusion of new tech-
nologies. This observation is orthogonal to our test. The relevant ﬁnding for our test is that
24Of course, there may be some arbitrariness in the order in which the variables are added to the regression. This
is not a relevant concern here because the succesive inclusion of institutional controls is used only for illustrative
purposes.
26democracy has a signiﬁcantly larger (i.e. more positive) eﬀect on the diﬀusion of those technologies
with a close predecessor technology.
We illustrate this ﬁnding graphically in Figure 4. This ﬁgure shows a measure of the eﬀect
of democracy in the adoption of technologies with (blue line) and without (pink line) competing
predecessor technologies for each ﬁve-year period. In particular, we take column 2’ estimates and
add the predicted eﬀects of democracy (both the overall and the interacted with the technology
classiﬁc a t i o n )t ot h ee r r o rt e r m .L e t ’ sc a l lt h i sv a r i a b l et h em od i ﬁed error. Then we classify countries
according to wether they have a democracy score of more than 7 or not in each period. Finally,
we compute the average modiﬁed error for technologies with and without competing predecessors
in countries with high and low democracy scores and for each period. Figure 4 plots the diﬀerence
in the modiﬁed average error between observations with high and low democracy scores for the
adoption of technologies with and without competing predecessors.
Figure 4 shows that in all but four ﬁve-year periods, a higher democracy score is associated with
a more intensive level of adoption of technologies with competing predecessors than of technologies
without a competing predecessor (i.e. the blue line is above the pink one). In three of the four
periods where this is not the case, the eﬀect of democracy is very similar across technology groups.
The larger eﬀect of democracy on the adoption of technologies without competing predecessor in
1960 is entirely driven by mail in Greece. The cross-country variance of technology adoption after
removing the ﬁxed eﬀects is approximately 0.9. The average diﬀerence in the eﬀect of democracy
between technologies with and without competing predecessors over the sample period plotted in
Figure 4 is 0.59. This suggest a quantitative important role of the diﬀerential eﬀect of democracy in
explaining the cross-country variation in technology adoption. Below, we elaborate more formally
on this conclusion and make it extensive to the other institutional variables.
In column 3 we inspect the conditional eﬀect of the military dummy and its interaction with
the predecessor technology dummy on technology diﬀusion. Having a military regime does not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the diﬀusion of new technologies in general. However, it signiﬁcantly slows down
the diﬀusion of new technologies that have a competing predecessor technology.
In column 4 we add the independence of the legislature to the set of institutional controls Rct.
The degree of ﬂexibility enjoyed by the legislature does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on technology
diﬀusion in general. It, does, however, slow the diﬀusion of new technologies with a competing
predecessor technology.
Column 5 also adds the judicial eﬀectiveness to Rct. This variable does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
27on the diﬀusion of new technologies in general. However, judiciary eﬀectiveness has a signiﬁcantly
larger eﬀect on the diﬀusion of technologies with a competing predecessor technology than on the
diﬀusion of technologies without one. The other proxy for the static political costs to the legislative
authority of raising diﬀusion barriers is the legislative ﬂexibility variable. Consistent with the
theory, we also observe that a high degree of legislative ﬂexibility reduces the speed of diﬀusion of
the technologies with a competing predecessor by more than that of the technologies that do not
have a competing predecessor.
Similarly, column 5 shows that the regime variables also have a diﬀerential eﬀect on the diﬀusion
of technologies with competing predecessor consistent with the relevance of lobbying in slowing the
speed of diﬀusion of technologies. Speciﬁcally, being in a military regime slows the diﬀusion of
technologies with a competing predecessor technology by more than the diﬀusion of technologies
without a competing predecessor technology. Finally, a higher degree of democracy is associated
with faster diﬀusion for technologies with a competing predecessor technology than for technologies
without one.
Table 8 reports the estimates for regression (2) when we classify technologies not only accord-
ing to the technological gap with the predecessor, but also according to whether the production
of the predecessor technology was concentrated. The diﬀerential eﬀects of institutions in the dif-
fusion of technologies with and without concentrated predecessors are very similar to the eﬀect
across technologies with and without competing predecessors. We ﬁnd that democracy and judi-
cial eﬀectiveness have a signiﬁcantly larger eﬀect on the diﬀusion of technologies with concentrated
predecessors. We also observe that legislative eﬀectiveness and military regime have a negative and
signiﬁcant diﬀerential eﬀect on the diﬀusion of technologies with a concentrated predecessor.
Our model emphasizes the importance of this dynamic component to policy making. In par-
ticular, current institutions aﬀect the political barriers next period. Hence, in our regressions, the
exogenous variables should reﬂect the lagged, rather than contemporaneous, institutions. In addi-
tion to being closer to the model, this variation should mitigate the possibility that our estimates
are driven by reverse causality. In the ﬁrst two columns of Table 9, we re-run the basic regression
for both classiﬁcations of technologies, replacing the institutional variables with their ﬁve-year lag.
Interestingly, all the results hold, even a fortiori.
The estimated eﬀect of lobbies on technology diﬀusion, in addition to being statistically sig-
niﬁcant, is quantitatively relevant. The variance of the diﬀusion level of the technologies with a
predecessor after removing the eﬀect of the technology-time dummies is 0.9. The dispersion induced
28by the estimated eﬀect of the diﬀerential eﬀect of institutional/policy variables on the diﬀusion of
technologies with a predecessor is 0.46. This means that the estimated eﬀect of lobbies on technology
diﬀusion represents 50 percent of the observed variation in technology diﬀusion.
The validity of the standard errors used to determine the statistical signiﬁcance of our estimates
hinges on the assumptions made about  ict . Next we show that our results are qualitatively and
quantitatively robust to various assumptions about the error terms. We illustrate this using the
speciﬁcation in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 9. The conclusions we reach for this particular speci-
ﬁcation are representative of all the speciﬁcations run in our analysis. Recall that in these columns
we report the estimates of regression (2) using a ﬁve year lag in the institutional variables. The odd
columns in Table 9 report the the estimates of the interactions of the institutional variables with
the competing predecessor technology dummy. The even columns do the same for the interactions
of the institutional variables with the concentrated and competing predecessor technology dummy.
We consider three alternatives to our baseline robust standard errors. Columns 3 and 4 cluster the
error terms at the country level. Columns 5 and 6 permit the correlation of the error term within
each of the technology-country clusters. Finally, columns 7 and 8 allow for serially correlated errors.
Speciﬁcally, we allow for heteroskedastic errors with a diﬀerent AR(1) process for the errors terms
in each technology-country cluster.
Comparing columns 1 and 2 with columns 3 through 6 we observe that clustering the errors does
not aﬀect the signiﬁcance of the interactions of the technology classiﬁcation dummies with democ-
racy, the military regime dummy and legislative ﬂexibility. Clustering, however, makes insigniﬁcant
the diﬀerential eﬀect of lagged judicial eﬀectiveness on technologies with close predecessors and/or
concentrated predecessor technologies. Whether we cluster the error terms in country groups or
technology-country groups does not make any diﬀerence.
In columns 7 and 8 we use a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimator to allow for
serial correlation and clustering in the error term. The point estimates obtained with this estimator
are quite similar to the point estimates obtained with our ﬁxed eﬀect estimator. The signs of the
estimated diﬀerential eﬀects of the institutional variables on technologies with concentrated and/or
competing predecessor technologies are unchanged, though the absolute value of these estimates
decline a little. The FGLS estimator, however, is more precise, and the t-statistics of the diﬀeren-
tial eﬀect of the institutional traits on the technologies with concentrated and/or close competing
predecessor technologies are even higher than those with the other estimators. The results that we
present in the rest of the paper are also very robust to these variations in the speciﬁcation for the
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3.3 Interpretation and robustness
We believe that we can interpret the results presented so far as evidence of a causal negative eﬀect
of lobbies on technology diﬀusion. This interpretation of the diﬀerential correlation between insti-
tutions and diﬀusion for the technologies with competing and concentrated, competing predecessor
is motivated by how unlikely it is to ﬁnd omitted variables that drive the correlation. These vari-
ables should be correlated to the institutional controls and have a larger eﬀect on the diﬀusion of
technologies with a close predecessor than on technologies without one.
Good governments, climate, unmeasured factors, high TFP and all the usual suspects that
normally explain why we ﬁnd positive correlation between institutions and development levels fail
to explain why the eﬀect of the relevant institutional variables is stronger for technologies with
a competing or concentrated, competing predecessor. Next, we discuss various observations that
make this failure to ﬁnd a relevant omitted variable more general.
Sector-speciﬁc omissions: In the sectors in our sample there is an even representation of tech-
nologies with and without competing predecessors. The same is true for technologies with and
without concentrated, competing predecessor technologies. Thus, the omission of sector-speciﬁc
variables that symmetrically aﬀect the technologies in the sector does not rationalize our estimates.
To show this formally, we include in our baseline regression the interaction between each of the
four institutional variables and each of the six sectors. In Table 10, we focus on the classiﬁcation of
technologies based on the presence of a competing predecessor, while Table 11 reports the estimates
of the diﬀerential eﬀects of institutions on technologies with concentrated, competing predecessors.
For comparison purposes, column 1 in Tables 10 and 11 are taken from columns 1 and 2 in Table
9. As anticipated, column 2 of Tables 10 and 11 show that the inclusion of sector-speciﬁce ﬀects of
the institutional traits that aﬀect the cost of lobbying does not reduce the size and signiﬁcance of
the diﬀerential eﬀects of these traits on the diﬀusion of technologies with competing (Table 10) and
with concentrated, competing predecessors (Table 11).
An example can help us illustrate how much this restricts the set of omitted variables that
could induce our estimates. One could think that the inverse of the productivity distance between
new and old technologies is a proxy for the capital intensity of the technology- the omitted variable.
Naturally, the protection of property rights is more relevant for the diﬀusion of more capital intensive
technologies, since capital is easier to expropriate than labor. Then, good institutions that protect
30better property rights should have a stronger eﬀect on the diﬀusion of technologies with a close
predecessor technology. Thus, the omission of the interaction between capital intensity classiﬁcation
and the institutional variables would bias the estimates of the interaction we introduce in regression
(2).
This argument, however, rests on the premise that there is a negative correlation between the
capital intensity of a technology and its productivity advantage with respect to the predecessor
technology. This premise does not hold in our sample of technologies because the capital intensity
of our technologies depends mostly on the sector the technology belongs to (i.e. transportation,
steel, telecommunications, and IT are capital intensive while textiles and mass communications are
n o t ) ,a n di nm o s to ft h es e c t o r sw eh a v ea ne v e nd i s t r i b u t i o no ft e c h n o l o g i e sb e t w e e nt h o s et h a t
have close predecessors and those that do not. Therefore, not controlling for the capital intensity
of technologies or for any other attribute that is relatively homogeneous within the sector will not
result in a bias of our estimates.25
Omission of social value of technology: A second potential source of bias in our estimates of the
eﬀect of lobbies on technology diﬀusion might arise from the omission of controls that measure the
social value of new technologies. The technology gap between a technology and its predecessor is
likely to be positively correlated with the social value of the new technology. The quality of institu-
tions may reﬂect the sensitivity of the government to the social value of institutions. Therefore, we
should expect that countries with “good” institutions are going to adopt policies that accelerate the
(relative) diﬀusion of technologies without a close predecessor technology. Therefore, the omission
of a measure of the social value of the new technology would result in a bias in the estimate of
the interaction between the technology classiﬁcation and the institutional variables. In particular,
it would bias the estimates towards ﬁnding lower eﬀects of good institutions in the diﬀusion of
technologies with close predecessors. However, as described above, we ﬁnd exactly the opposite.
The degree of democracy, non-military regime and the eﬀectiveness of the judicial system have
a stronger (positive) eﬀect on the diﬀusion of technologies with a close predecessor than without
one.26
25Another variable that may aﬀect the speed of diﬀusion of certain technologies is whether the government under-
takes complementary investments. These investments are particularly important in transportation (roads, railroads,
airports, harbours) and telecommunications. Omitting the magnitude of these government investments does not bias
our estimates given the sector-speciﬁcity of the investments’ importance.
26A similar argument could be made about the biases from the omission of measures of the willingness to accept
change. It is not obvious to us how this variable would be correlated (if at all) with our institutional variables. One
31Omission of diﬀerential eﬀe c to fc o n t r o l si nXct : Another source of omitted variable bias in
the estimates of the diﬀerential eﬀects of the institutional variables on the technologies with close
predecessors may be the omission of the interaction between the technology classiﬁcation and the
controls in Xct. It could be argued that technologies with a close predecessor are more complemen-
tary to, say, human capital. Democratic institutions may be more eﬀective in promoting human
capital accumulation. Omitting the interaction between human capital measures and institutions
might then generate a positive diﬀerential eﬀect of institutional variables on technologies with a
close predecessor for reasons other than lobbies. To explore this possibility, column 3 of tables 10
and 11 allow for a diﬀerential eﬀect of the controls in Xct (income per capita, enrollment rates and
electricity production) on the diﬀusion of the technologies with a predecessor (Table 10) and with
a concentrated, competing predecessor (Table 11). The diﬀerential eﬀects of institutions on the
diﬀusion of technologies with a competing predecessor or with a concentrated, competing predeces-
sor are largely robust to the presence of diﬀerential controls. The only institutional variable that
becomes insigniﬁcant after allowing for a diﬀerential set of controls is judicial eﬀectiveness. Hence,
the diﬀerential eﬀect of institutions on the diﬀusion of technologies with competing or concentrated,
competing predecessors is not driven by the interaction between the technology classiﬁcation and
any of the correlates in Xct, including human capital measures.
Beyond good vs. bad institutions: The fact that we can simultaneously identify the diﬀerential
eﬀect of all the institutional variables on the diﬀusion of the technologies with a competing or
concentrated, competing predecessor raises the hurdle for the potential omitted variables since, to
account for the estimated coeﬃcients, they must be appropriately correlated with all the variables in
Rct.T h i si sp a r t i c u l a r l yd i ﬃcult since we ﬁnd that some measures of good institutions - democracy,
judicial eﬀectiveness and non-military regime - accelerate more the diﬀusion of technologies with
competing predecessor, but one variable that is usually associated with good institutions - legislative
ﬂexibility - slows more the diﬀusion of this same group of technologies.27 This ﬁnding is perfectly
possibility is that, as discussed in Acemoglu and Robinson [2002], bad institutions are more opposed to the adoption
of more revolutionary technologies because these may threaten the political power of current leaders. If so, this
omission would bias the estimates in favor of a larger eﬀect of democracy, judicial eﬀectiveness and military on the
diﬀusion of technologies without a close predecessor; the opposite of what we ﬁnd.
27The fact that the sign of the eﬀe c to fm a n yo ft h ev a r i a b l e si nRct on the diﬀusion of technologies without a
predecessor technology is diﬀerent than for the technologies with a predecessor puts some additional constraints on
the variance and correlations of the omitted variables with the endogenous and exogenous variables necessary to
account for the estimated coeﬃcients.
32natural, however, if lobbies constitute an important deterrent to the adoption of technologies with
a competing predecessor.
Omission of Geography variables:T oi n c r e a s eo u rc o n ﬁdence in the robustness and interpretation
of the estimated diﬀerential eﬀect of institutions across technology groups, we explore next some
further omissions. For most of them, however, it is hard to argue why they should aﬀect diﬀerentially
the technology groups in a way that correlates with the diﬀerential eﬀect that our institutional traits
have.
The size of the country or its economy should have an eﬀect on the diﬀu s i o no fs o m eo ft h e
technologies such as transportation and communication technologies. To explore whether they af-
fect the estimated diﬀerential eﬀects of institutions, column 4 includes as regressors the country
area and population while column 5 includes real GDP. Of course, we allow these variables to
have a diﬀerential eﬀect on the technologies with a competing predecessor (Table 10) and with a
concentrated, competing predecessor (Table 11). Though these measures of size have a signiﬁcant
diﬀerential eﬀect on the diﬀusion of technologies with a predecessor technology, the diﬀerential ef-
fects of institutions on the diﬀusion of technologies with competing or with concentrated, competing
predecessors are virtually unaﬀected.
In columns 6 and 7 we also allow for country ﬁxed eﬀects (column 6) and country ﬁxed eﬀects
interacted with the dummy for technologies with a competing predecessor (column 7). This again
does not have much eﬀect on the size and signiﬁcance of the estimates of the interactions between
institutions and the predecessor technology dummy. The only relevant variable that becomes in-
signiﬁc a n ta f t e ra l l o w i n gf o rd i ﬀerent eﬀects of the country ﬁxed eﬀects is the interaction between
the eﬀectiveness of the judiciary and the predecessor dummy. That is not very surprising since the
judiciary variable is constant over time.
Source of identiﬁcation: In column 8 we try to understand the source of the identiﬁcation for
the interaction between technologies and institutions. In particular, we explore whether we are
obtaining any identiﬁcation from the time-technology dimension or whether all the identiﬁcation
comes from the country-technology dimension. To do that, we include in the regression both country
ﬁxed eﬀects and country ﬁxed eﬀects interacted with the dummy for technologies with previous
competing technologies. After eliminating the country-technology dimension, the diﬀerential eﬀects
of the military dummy and of democracy on technologies that have a competing technology decline
by approximately half and become insigniﬁcant.28 However, the diﬀerential eﬀect of the ﬂexibility
28The eﬀectiveness of the judiciary measure drops from the regression because it only has cross-country variation.
33of the legislature remains negative and signiﬁcant at the two percent signiﬁcance level. This means
we are identifying some of the diﬀerential eﬀects of institutions on technology diﬀusion by exploiting
the time series variation of the institutions.
Column 8 in Table 11 explores the source of the identiﬁcation of the diﬀerential eﬀect of insti-
tutions on the diﬀusion of technologies with concentrated, competing predecessors. As before, we
do that by including, simultaneously, country ﬁxed eﬀects and country ﬁxed eﬀects interacted with
the dummy for technologies with concentrated, competing predecessors. When doing that, we ﬁnd
t h a tt h ee s t i m a t eo ft h ed i ﬀerential eﬀect of legislative ﬂexibility does not change while the estimate
of the diﬀerential eﬀects of democracy and the military dummy declines by about half. However,
these diﬀerential eﬀects of the institutional traits on technologies with close, concentrated predeces-
sor technologies are still signiﬁcant: legislative ﬂexibility is signiﬁcant at the one percent level while
democracy and the military dummy are signiﬁcant at the 7 percent level. Hence, we are identifying
an important portion of the diﬀerential eﬀects of institutions on technology diﬀusion through the
time series variation of the institutions. This makes it even more unlikely that the estimates of
the diﬀerential eﬀects of institutions on technology diﬀusion are driven by omitted variables and
reinforces the conclusion that lobbies are an important impediment to technology diﬀusion.
Reverse causality: Similar arguments lead to the conclusion that it is unlikely that reverse
causality drives the observed diﬀerential correlation between diﬀusion for technologies with prede-
cessor technologies and the institutional variables in Rct. Namely, it is hard to argue why the speed
of diﬀusion in the sectors with an incumbent technology, but not in the sectors without one, led to a
democratic regime or to a legislative system where the authorities had no legislative independence.
We believe that the previous discussion makes this argument very diﬃcult to sustain. In addition,
it is important to note that the technologies we are studying are quite micro, and therefore the
eﬀect of their diﬀusion (or lack thereof) in aggregate macro variables, such as GDP and the labor
market, may be quite limited.
4 Concluding remarks
Diﬀerences in the available technology across countries are believed to be a ﬁrst order determinant
of cross-country income per capita diﬀerentials. In this paper we have explored the empirical
relevance of one of the determinants of technology diﬀusion. Namely, lobbying eﬀorts by producers
of incumbent technologies. We have observed that lobbies signiﬁcantly slow the speed of diﬀusion
34of new technologies.
In addition, the ﬁndings of this paper also illustrate one channel by which institutions aﬀect
development. Namely, institutions aﬀect the parties’ incentives to engage in lobbying activities,
lobbying slows technology diﬀusion, and technology aﬀects crucially development. The empirical
identiﬁcation of this mechanism is a contribution to the institutions and growth literature.
This literature has followed two routes to progress: In standard regression analysis, it has tried
to identify the eﬀect of institutions on income per capita by controlling for elements other than
institutions that may aﬀect income per capita diﬀerences. This route has typically been unsuccessful
because institutions become insigniﬁcant after including in the regression either a few reasonable
controls or country ﬁxed eﬀects. A second route has argued that attenuation bias is responsible
for this insigniﬁcance and has tried to ﬁnd good instruments of institutions. This approach has
been more successful, but it is still not clear whether the proposed instruments are truly valid.29
Further, since income per capita is highly correlated with many indicators of “good institutions,” it
is very hard to detect the speciﬁc institutional traits that drive income per capita diﬀerences with
this instrumental variables approach.
This paper provides an alternative route to establishing empirically the link between institu-
tions and development, which hinges on two pillars. First, the use of measures of diﬀusion for
various technologies as dependent variables. Second, the identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of institutions
by interacting institutions to a relevant ex-ante classiﬁcation of technologies.
We believe that our approach has some interesting virtues. First, as we have argued above, it is
very robust to omitted variable and reverse causality biases. Second, by using a multidimensional
dependent variable with so much variation both over time and in the cross-section as technology
diﬀusion, the test of the null that lobbies have no eﬀect on technology diﬀusion is more powerful.
I n d e e d ,w eh a v ei d e n t i ﬁed the eﬀect of lobbies on technology diﬀusion through the diﬀerential eﬀects
of institutions on technology diﬀu s i o ne v e na f t e ri n t r o d u c i n gc o u n t r yﬁxed eﬀects and the interaction
of country ﬁxed eﬀects with the a priori classiﬁcation of technologies. Finally, with our approach we
have been able to pinpoint some speciﬁc institutional traits that strongly aﬀect technology diﬀusion.
This step is very important for two reasons. First and foremost, it is critical to draw speciﬁc policy
recommendations from this kind of empirical analysis. Second, we have observed that not all the
institutional characteristics that are usually associated to advanced economies accelerate the speed
29See the debate between Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson [2001] and Glaeser et al. [2004] and Acemoglu et al
[2005].
35of diﬀusion of technologies. In particular, more ﬂexibility of the legislative authority makes it
easier for lobbies to induce him to raise political barriers to the diﬀusion of new technologies that
ultimately slow their diﬀusion.
The strategy used to identify the role of lobbies on technology diﬀusion captures the barriers
raised by incumbents that compete with new entrants in the product market. This is just one of the
possible mechanisms by which interest groups (broadly understood) slow down the diﬀusion of new
technologies. De Soto [1989], for example, claims that corrupt bureaucracies prevent the adoption
of new technologies. Acemoglu and Robinson [2000] and [2002] argue that elites block the adoption
of new technologies in order to preserve their political power. Finally, various authors have claimed
that interest groups such as unions or elites may block the adoption of technologies that aﬀect the
labor market outcomes. One interesting line of research that we plan on pursuing in the future
is to evaluate the empirical relevance of these mechanisms. Doing that will require increasing the
number of technologies in our data set. For example, our data set only contains one labor saving
technology (i.e. industrial robots).
The empirical strategy used in this paper can be applied to identify mechanisms other than
lobbies through which institutions aﬀect technology diﬀusion and income per capita. These exercises
may provide us with a better understanding of the speciﬁc institutional traits that trigger engines
of development such as technology adoption. If, as this and other papers suggest, institutions
are important for development, identifying the likely consequences of speciﬁc institutional traits is
as necessary for the advancement of poor countries as sequencing the DNA is for curing genetic
diseases.
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42Appendices
Appendix 1 classiﬁes technologies according to the productivity diﬀerential between a given
technology and its proceeding technology. Appendix 2 documents the size of the sunk costs necessary
to implement or produce the technologies that preceded those technologies that implied a relatively
small productivity gain.
Appendix 1: Productivity Diﬀerentials
We ﬁrst describe the new technology and the ways in which it dominated its predecessor tech-
nology. We then present studies that have tried to the quantify productivity diﬀerential between
the new and old technology. Technologies improve quickly after their invention, so we compute the
productivity diﬀerential approximately 30 years after the new technology’s invention date.
It is worth noting that, although the productivity diﬀerential between two technologies is a
technological attribute, some technologies may have diﬀerentials that vary according to geography.
Given that most of the information about productivity diﬀerentials is speciﬁc to only a few countries,
this could be a problem for the classiﬁcation. This problem is not of practical relevance, however,
because, for most of the technologies, the diﬀerential is either in the hundreds or under three.
Given the diﬀerence in magnitudes considered, it is diﬃcult to argue that geographical variation
will signiﬁcantly alter the classiﬁcations.
Textiles
Ring Spindles
Cotton textiles became the ﬁrst truly global industry after a series of innovations mechanized
spinning and weaving, two of the most important cotton activities. In 1770, Hargreaves invented
the spinning Jenny, and in 1779, Crompton designed the spinning mule. The ﬁrst ring spindles
were simultaneously invented by John Thorp and Charles Danforth in 1828. The main technical
diﬀerence between the ring and mule spindles is that the ring spins continuously, while the mule
spins intermittently.
According to Saxonhouse and Wright [2000], “Consistent with the trend in modern scholarship,
our reading of the evidence was that on close examination, there was no simple right or wrong
choice [between ring and mule spindles] prior to the technical breakthroughs in ring spinning [...]
that came after 1913” (p. 2). “Rather than seeing an older, ‘mature,’technology supplanted by a
43more advanced modern form, we observe two technological paradigms in competitive coexistence,
each on capable of supporting ongoing productivity growth through complementary improvements
in machinery, organization and workforce skills” (p. 10).
S a x o n h o u s ea n dW r i g h tp r o v i d et h ea v e r a g es p e e do fn e wm u l ea n dr i n gs p i n d l e si nas a m p l e
of 15 countries for various periods up to 1920. As late as 1914, the average spinning speed of new
mule spindles was 9600 rpm, while that of ring spindles was 8900 rpm. This data indicates the
productivity diﬀerential between ring and mule spindles was relatively small.
Steel
Bessemer
Prior to the invention of the Bessemer process, steel was produced with crucibles. Wrought iron
bars were broken up and heated in clay crucibles, each holding at most 40 to 50 pounds of metal.
Ten to 15 days were then devoted to converting the iron into steel, which required large quantities
of fuel. Consequently, crucible steel was expensive, selling for £50 to £60 per ton.
Bessemer’s process avoided these costly and time-consuming steps by converting pig iron directly
into steel. Pig iron contains excessive amounts of carbon and other elements (such as silicon,
phosphorus and sulphur), which make it brittle. This carbon content can be drastically reduced,
and the other elements can be burned out by oxidation, thus converting the iron into steel. Bessemer
used this process by developing a converter that had many small holes in its base allowing admission
of an air blast that oxidated the molten iron.
The Bessemer converter brought an unprecedented productivity improvement over the crucible.
It cast ﬁve tons of steel in 20 to 30 minutes, while the crucible process took 14 to 15 days to obtain
only 40 or 50 pounds of steel (Fisher [1963] p. 117).
Open Hearth and Blast Oxygen
Subsequent innovations in steel production generated much smaller productivity improvements
than the Bessemer furnace did. Open hearth furnaces did not signiﬁcantly improve the productivity
of the Bessemer converter, while blast oxygen furnaces were only 2.5 times more productive than
open hearth furnaces (Adams and Dirlam [1966]).
Electric Arc
Electric arc furnaces were entirely diﬀerent from previous innovations in steel production. The
invention of the electric arc allowed for the ﬁrst time the eﬃcient production of the stainless steel
44used in cookware, cutlery, hardware, surgical instruments, major appliances, industrial equipment
and building materials for skyscrapers. As the electric arc was the ﬁrst technology to produce




The telegraph revolutionized communications, achieving an increase in communication speed no
development in communications has achieved since. Between 1840 and 1850, the telegraph cut costs
by a factor of 100 and reduced elapsed time per word transmitted by a factor of three thousand,
from ten days to ﬁve minutes for a one-page message between New York and Chicago (Sichel [1997]
p. 127).
Telephones
The productivity increase between the telephone and the telegraph is relatively small and, at
times, insigniﬁcant, depending on the task being completed. Solymar [1999] and Smith [2004]
report that it took about six times longer to tap a message, then translate the Morse code into
words than it took to read it by telephone. Coe [1995], however, estimates that it took about the
same time to dispatch trains by phone and by the telegraph. Additionally, Casson [2004] cites a
United Press study that estimates it also took the same time to dispatch news to 10 cities by phone
a n db yt e l e g r a p h .T a k i n gt h ea v e r a g eo ft h e s et h r e et a s k s ,w ee s t i m a t et h a tt h et e l e p h o n ei n c r e a s e d
communications productivity by a factor of three.
Cell Phones
Unlike the telephone, the mobile phone signiﬁcantly increased communications productivity. In
1993, Gallup conducted a survey of cell phone users asking how much their productivity increased
by using a mobile phone instead of a ﬁxed phone. Responders reported an average productivity
increase of 34 percent.
Mass Communications
Newspapers
Newspapers did not have a clear predecessor, and thus can be classiﬁed as having an arbitrarily
large productivity diﬀerential.
45Radios and TVs
Determining the productivity diﬀerentials between newspapers, radios and TVs is diﬃcult be-
cause each technology aﬀected the productivity of mass communication, but also added an entirely
new dimension to the mass communication industry. If they are considered only alternative ways of
communicating information, the relevant productivity measure is the amount of information they
convey per unit of eﬀort on behalf of the reader, listener or viewer.
Studies comparing the recall rates for each media typically conclude that recall rates are higher
with newspaper than with radios or televisions. For example, Hooper Inc. conducted a study in 1969
that showed the following average unaided recall rates: 34% for magazine ads, 28% for newspaper
ads, 19% for prime TV commercials and 14% for radio commercials (Kelley and Jugenheimer [2003]
p. 38.)
To compute a complete productivity measure, one should also consider the diﬀerence in energy
used by the reader, listener or viewer. Studies of this have shown that a person’s metabolic rates
are lowest when watching TV and lower when listening to radio than when reading.
These productivity measures are still incomplete, however, because they ignore the fact that both
radios and TVs introduced to mass communication the ability to transmit sound and image over
thousands of kilometers. In this sense, it can be argued that radios and TVs are horizontal, rather
than vertical, innovations and that neither have a predecessor technology. To quantify this, one
could measure the bandwidth of radios and TVs, which captures amount of information transmitted
in sound and image. AM radio has 10 Kilohertz of bandwidth, while FM radio has 200 kHz and
TV has 6000 kHz (Wells and Hakanen [1997]).
In practice, we will consider televisions and radios as technologies that both are and are not
subject to the eﬀects of institutions through lobbying. First we will consider them as vertical
innovations that are sensitive to the eﬀects of institution trough lobbying by classifying radios
and TVs as technologies with small productivity diﬀerentials based on their respective recall rates.
Then, in Appendix 2, we recognize that the sunk costs of setting up a newspaper or radio station
are small relative to other sunk costs we consider (for example, the cost of setting up a car factory or
shipyard). Therefore, both radios and TVs can be classiﬁed as a technology without a predecessor
technology that has large rents to defend and is technologically close to the new technology. This
permits us to explore the robustness of our estimates to the classiﬁcation of this particular group
of technologies that is especially diﬃcult to make.
Information Technology
46PCs and Robots
PCs and robots are radical technologies both because of the productivity improvements in using
them to complete old tasks (ex: word processing) and, more importantly, because of the new tasks
that became feasible with their invention.
With respect to faster completion of old tasks, the University of Indiana in 1981 concluded that
word processing with a PC instead of a typewriter would reduce the cost of typing by 56 percent.
Several studies have also estimated the cost reduction from using robots in car manufacturing
plants. Ayres and Miller [1983] document productivity increases ranging from 30% for high capacity
plants to 330% for low capacity plants, and these increase to 80% for high capacity and 560% for
low capacity when plants use robots with computer aided design (CAM) capabilities. Productivity
increases in low capacity plants are signiﬁcantly higher because they can better exploit the ﬂexibility
g a i n st h a tc o m ef r o mu s i n gr o b o t s .
In addition to replacing typewriters and manual labor, robots and PCs also allow the completion
of many new tasks. For example, robots made operation of hazardous materials in extreme envi-
ronments safer, and computers greatly reduced the cost of completing computations and organizing
and distributing information. They also revolutionized graphic design.
Transportation
Railways
In some countries, railways constituted a revolution in both passenger and freight transportation.
In the pre-rail era, for example, it took two to four days to travel the 90 miles that separate New
York from Philadelphia (Oliver [1956]), giving an average speed of about two miles per hour. Within
a few years after the introduction of the railroad, average passenger transportation speeds were 10
times higher than that.
Even larger was the impact of railroads in freight transportation in countries where the only
predecessor to railroads was an ordinary road. Freight trains run slower than passenger trains, but
transported hundreds of tons of freight at once. In the mid 1850s, the average freight train in New
York transported over 200 tons of freight and, as early as 1840, the Reading locomotives transported
over 400 tons of coal at average speeds of 10 mph. In contrast, the size of freights transported by
road was below 10 tons.
Locklin [1960] studied the relative cost of transporting corn and wheat in railroads vs. with
ordinary roads. For very short distances (i.e. less than 10 miles), transportation costs for railroads
47and roads were about the same, but as the distance increased, railroads became signiﬁcantly more
economical. For example, transporting corn across 300 miles was 10 times cheaper by rail than by
ordinary roads.
In countries with canal systems, however, railroads did not bring such a signiﬁcant increase
in productivity to freight transportation, although they were still revolutionary in the realm of
passenger transportation. Canal transportation was cheaper, but slower, than rail transportation
(Oliver [1956]). In 1852 rail shipments from Cincinnati to New York City took from six to eight
days, about a third of the time required for service via the canals, Lake Erie and the Hudson River
(Stover [1997]). Fogel [1964] estimates that railways reduced the cost of transporting cargo relative
to canals by slightly less than a factor of two.
Cars and Trucks
Cars were ﬁr s tp r o d u c e di nE u r o p ei nt h el a t e1 8 0 0 s—t h eﬁrst internal combustion engine
was introduced in 1863 — and came to the U.S., where they underwent the greatest development,
in the 1890s. From their invention through the 1950s, cars were less productive than trains, ﬁrst
because cars took several years to even acquire enough power and reliability over long distances
to compete with the speed of trains and then because of the slow pace of road construction and
improvements. For example, when cars were ﬁrst invented, it was quite an achievement that an
Oldsmobile covered 820 miles in seven and a half days, sometimes driving at “train speeds of 35
miles per hour ”(Curcio and Curcio [2000] p.152). By 1904, Henry Ford’s car was setting land speed
records of 91.4 mph, but even this did not qualify the automobile to compete with the train (Weiss
[2003]). This was predominately because, although cars were more convenient for traveling quickly
over short distances — for example, doctors frequently used them to make house calls — they were not
built to maintain their speed or hold up for long-distance travel, as trains were. As Weiss explains,
“At the start of the 1920s, 90 percent of the cars were open touring cars” ([2003] pp. 47-8).
Compared to cars, trucks showed more of a productivity improvement over trains; however,
they did not immediately dominate trains in all arenas of freight transportation. They were more
eﬃcient than trains in very short distances, but when transporting cargo for distances above 80
miles, rail transportation was cheaper than road transportation, even when using 20-ton trucks
(Warner [1962] p. 237).
Planes
The ﬁrst commercial planes appeared in the late 1920s and, by 1925, planes could cross the U.S.
48in about 48 hours. In 1936, the DC-3 could transport 900 pounds of cargo and 21 passengers at a
speed of 180 mph. The Stratolier, which appeared in 1938, transported 33 passengers at 250 mph.
These speeds, while impressive, are still less than ﬁve times the speed of the fastest trains, which
in 1894 traveled at an average speed of about 55 mph (Oliver [1956]). As early as 1889, Nellie Bly
traveled from San Francisco to New York by train in less than four days, despite being unable to
catch the fast train from Chicago to New York (Oliver [1956]). Planes were not, then, suﬃciently
more productive than trains.
Shipping
Sailing Ships
The 1840s and 50s saw the development of a new generation of sail ships: the clippers, the ﬁrst
of which was the “Rainbow,” designed by John Griﬃth in 1841. The innovations in the Rainbow’s
design included a “lengthening of the bow into graceful upward curves, making it concave rather
than convex in contour, and thus enabling it to slice like a knife through the waters” (Oliver [1956] p.
196). The Rainbow was a 750-ton vessel and was by far the smallest clipper of its time. Subsequent
clippers weighed anywhere from 908 tons (the “Sea Witch”) to 4000 tons (the “Challenge,” built
in 1853).
Clippers were famous for their speed. The “Lightning” traveled 436 miles in 24 hours, or at an
average of 18 miles per hour. On one occasion, she traveled from New York to Liverpool in 13.5
days. The “Flying Cloud” sailed from New York to San Francisco in 89 days, covering 433 miles
in one day alone. The “Sovereign of the Seas” logged 495 statue miles in one day and for four
consecutive days covered an average of 378 miles per day. Finally, the “Oriental” made the passage
from New York to Hong Kong in 81 days (Oliver [1956] p. 197).
Steam Ships
The development and subsequent improve of steam ships were long, arduous tasks. The ﬁrst
steam ships were used primarily for river navigation because ocean steam navigation presented many
technological problems. For example, the paddle-wheel propulsion system proved unsatisfactory on
rough waters; the main lubricant available at the time, animal oils, became rancid; the daily task of
blowing out the boilers became a hazard on the ocean because the vessel idled during the process;
the supply of coal needed for a transoceanic voyage occupied too much cargo space; and marine
engines were poorly developed. These problems made commercial use of steam ships for ocean and
transoceanic routes impractical for years after the steam ships’ invention.
49The problems were gradually overcome with a series of innovations, including the replacement
of the paddle-wheel with the screw propeller. It was not until the end of the century, however, that
the fastest steam ships sailed at speeds beyond the reach of the clippers. In 1893, the “Columbia”
held the naval record of continuous sea speed at 22.8 knots (miles per hour) for four hours and an
average of 18.4 knots while crossing the Atlantic (Oliver [1956]).
50Appendix 2: Size of sunk Costs of Production of Predecessor Technologies
In general it is relatively easy to classify the old technologies according to the size of the sunk
costs of their production. Following is documentation based on a few examples of the sunk costs
of producing predecessor technologies whose productivity is relatively close to the productivity of
their succeeding technologies.
Textiles
Mule Spindle (predecessor to ring spindle)
The ﬁrst mule was invented in a home in 1779 by a 26-year-old boy (Walton [1925]); similarly,
the second mule was erected in a loft above a school house (French [1862]). The small, unsophisti-
cated settings for the construction of these ﬁrst mules indicate that producing mules required small
sunk costs. Consistent with this estimate, the mule had a low purchase cost,30 compact form and
inconsiderable weight and was most frequently found in “a moderate-sized room of an ordinary
dwelling-house” (French [1862]). In fact, after it was invented, “[the mule] was many years rather
a domestic implement than a portion of the great modern factory system” (French [1862]).
Steel
Bessemer (predecessor to open hearth)
Liddel [1916] reports costs of setting up various types of metallurgical plants from Hofman [1913]
at the turn of the century. The cost of building an acid Bessemer plant with capacity to produce
2000 tons of steel per day was $900,000.
Open Hearth (predecessor to blast oxygen steel furnace)
Liddel [1916] also reports that the cost of building an acid open hearth plant able to produce
1000 tons of steel per day was $1.5 million.
Telecommunications
Telegraph (predecessor to telephone)
To transit telegrams, it is necessary to set up a complex wire network, which supposes a large
sunk cost to telegrams. In 1848, the average cost of constructing the six regions in the Atlantic,
Lake and Mississippi line — Atlantic and Ohio; Pittsburg, Cincinnati and Louisville; Ohio and
30Mules with 300 spindles were still relatively cheap and sold for only $345 (Wallace [1972]).
51Mississippi; Ohio, Indiana and Illinois; Lake Erie; and Illinois and Mississippi — was $150 per mile,
or $240 per Km (Thompson [1947]). Additionally, construction of the New York to Erie line was
p r o j e c t e di n1 8 4 8t oc o s t$ 2 5 0p e rm i l ef o rt h eﬁrst wire and an additional $100 for each wire after
that (Thompson [1947]). In 1850, there were about 4000 miles of wire in operation in the UK.
The quality of the lines in the UK was higher than in the US. This emphasis in quality lead to
higher construction costs. In some cases, these amounted to $600 per mile. Finally, the total cost of
manufacturing, laying and bringing into working order the Persian Gulf submarine telegraph line,
built in 1964, was £411,751 (Phelps [1969]).
Telephone (predecessor to Cell phone)
Similar to telegrams, setting up the telephone lines necessary for telephonic communication was
very costly. In its 1887 report to shareholders, The American Bell Telephone Company announced
that it “intended to complete this year the lines between New York and Boston, to extent from
Albany towards Buﬀalo and to build a line from Chicago to Milwaukee. The estimated cost of about
$1,000,000” (Rhodes [1929]). By 1888, The American Bell Company had constructed telephone lines
with 26,038 miles of wire, which covered a distance of approximately 20 times less than the actual
wire length. These lines cost approximately $2,200,000, or $84 per mile of wire. In total, it cost The
American Bell Company spent over $35 million to build lines, build plants to meet growing customer
demands, upgrade existing plants’ technology and install underground wires (Rhodes [1929]).
In 1886, building a pole line between New York and Philadelphia with 70 wires and 24 copper
wires cost approximately $215,000 (Rhodes [1929]).
Mass Communication
Newspaper (predecessor to radio)
As evidenced by the large number of radical and mainstream newspapers that have been circu-
lated since the printing press was invented, the cost of purchasing a printing press has always had
a relatively low sunk cost. In the 1830s, for example, most radical, unstamped papers were printed
on hand presses, which cost as little as £10 to acquire.
The low sunk cost of buying a printing press has persisted even while printing presses have
experienced signiﬁcant technological advancements. After 1836, for example, most radical presses
began using the technologically superior steam press. Even then, papers like The Northern Star
cost only £690 to start (Curran and Seaton [1981]).
52In 1912, after the industrialization of the press, newspapers still required only a small sunk cost
to start. For example, The Daily Citizen b e g a ni n1 9 1 2w i t ho n l y£ 3 0 , 0 0 0a n dt h eDaily Herald
used only £300 to start and, with the help of public subscriptions, achieved a circulation of almost
250,000 (Curran and Seaton [1981]).
Radio (predecessor to TV)
Similar to newspaper, the low sunk cost of setting up a radio station is immediately evident
in the large number of radio stations that opened in the U.S. in the 1920s. As Archer describes
it, “The advent of radio broadcasting created one of the most extraordinary booms in the history
of the American people. From all over the United States orders for equipment for prospective
radio broadcasting stations came pouring in to the manufacturers of such apparatus”. According
to Archer [1938], from August of 1921 to May of 1922, at least 306 radio stations began in the U.S.
alone. This number is unsurprising, given that the total cost of setting up a “modest” radio station
was only around $50,000 (Archer [1938]).
Transportation
Canal (predecessor to freight trains)
Building a canal comes with a very large sunk cost, which is demonstrated in the following
example.
In the late eighteenth century, the U.S. planned to create a canal that would provide transporta-
tion from the East Coast, past the Appalachian Mountains and into the interior of the country. New
York State funding was approved for the project in 1816 and, one year later, construction on what
is now known as the Erie Canal began. Built without the use of heavy machinery, but rather with
the manual labor of British, German and Irish immigrants, the canal was ﬁnished in 1825 at a total
cost of $7 million.
See Table A.1 for examples of the cost of building canals in the US, the UK, Canada and France.
Railway (predecessor to trucks, cars and planes)
Establishing a rail network came at a very high sunk cost when railways were ﬁrst developed
in the 1800s and continues to carry with it high costs as railways are updated and new tracks are
built today. Dodge described the cost and labor required to build the Union Paciﬁc Railroad [1965].
When the project was initially considered in 1836, bills were introduced in Congress suggesting as
much as $96 million for the railroad’ s construction. Once construction ﬁnally began, the Union
Paciﬁc was funded by government bonds paying $48,000 per mile for the ﬁrst 150 miles west of
53Cheyenne and $32,000 per mile thereafter. Additionally, building the railroad required at one time
the use of 10,000 animals to haul supplies and consistently required from 8,000 to 10,000 laborers.
Lewis Clement, one of the pioneers of the Union Paciﬁca n dC e n t r a lP a c i ﬁc railroads also
discussed the costs associated with building the two railroads. According to Clement, in 1868, it
cost $51.97 to ship a ton of rail to Sacramento, which, added to the cost of the rail itself, totaled
$143.67 per ton of rail. This cost did not include transportation of the rail up the Sacramento River
(Ambrose [2000]).
Additionally, construction of the Union Paciﬁc railroad required the construction of snow sheds
and galleries over the rack running through the Sierra Nevada to keep snow of the tracks in the
winter. According to Galloway [1950], “About 2,500 men were employed and six trains were used
to bring the material” (p. 150). When completed, the sheds and galleries covered 37 miles of track,
used 65,000,000 feet of lumber and cost a total of $2,000,000.
Other, less famous railroads came at similarly large costs. A railroad in England that was
constructed in the 1820s and ran from Liverpool to Manchester in England cost $187,495 per mile
(Galloway [1950]). The Long Island Railroad, constructed in the late 1800s, cost a total of $1,730,000
to build (Smith [1958]).
Even today, updating old track and building new track requires a high sunk cost. In Australia,
for example, the cost of a new ‘T-line’ railway from Goulburn to Yass cost $127 million (Laird
[2001]).
Cars (predecessor to planes)
As with previous transportation technologies, cars also require a high sunk cost to produce. In
the early 1900s, Ford constructed a plant on the River Rouge at a cost of $3.5 million and a second
plant in Kearny, New Jersey, which cost $2.5 million (Biggs [1996]). By the 1950s, the cost to Ford
of updating its plants to produce its popular 1953 model car was an enormous $1 billion (Weiss
[2003]).
Other large car producers incurred similarly high sunk costs. In 1922, for example, William
Durant purchased a plant in Elizabeth, New Jersey for $5,525,000, and, during the 1930s, GM
spent $346 million in new plants and equipment (Weiss [2003]).
Shipping
Sailing Ships (predecessor to steam and motor ships)
54From the beginning of the shipbuilding industry through at least when steam ships were invented,
it required a high sunk cost to begin producing sailing ships. Huﬃngton and Cliﬀord [1939] describe
the many restrictions on a yard’ s location, which put a high price on the production of sailing ships
that was incurred even before the yard is built. To keep the costs of transportation down, they
explain that shipyards needed to be located on a river or estuary, allowing ships to be built “without
fear of wreck” (Huﬃngton and Cliﬀord [1939] p.363). At the same time, however, the yards needed
to be close to bog ore and forge sites, which provided iron for ship ﬁttings, and forests abundant
in oak and pine, which provided wood for the hulls and masts. In addition to these requirements,
shipyards also needed a large, ﬂat area that aﬀorded room to construct several-hundred ton ships.
Combined, these limitations left few viable options for the location of shipyards, which meant only
a few producers could successfully enter the shipbuilding industry.
Huﬃngton and Cliﬀord also explain that, by 1815, timber supplies near the shipyards were ex-
hausted, forcing builders to purchase timber located further and further away and incur substantial
transportation costs. In one instance, “It was necessary for a certain builder to purchase an entire
woodlot, located some twenty miles inland, in order to get a single tree suitable for the forming of
‘knees”’ (Huﬃngton and Cliﬀord [1939] p.368).
The high cost of building a yard to produce steam ships speaks to the high costs involved in
producing sailing ships. Because steam and sailing ships are around the same size and require
many of the same materials (by the time steam ships were invented, many sailing ships were made
of steel, as well as wood), the yard speciﬁcations for the two ships types were similar. Thus, speciﬁc
measures of the costs involved in building a steam shipyard, which are more widely available than
those of setting up a sailing shipyard, can be used as a proxy to get a general understanding of
the costs of starting sailing shipyard. In Britain in 1900, a graving dock to release ships into the
water cost approximately £100,000. More generally, the value of all the shipbuilding materials in
the Clydebank (Britain) yard of John Brown and Company was £131,220 in 1899 and £200,691 in
1910 (Pollard and Robertson [1979]).
55Table 3: Technologies and Countries in Sample
Period covered: 1788-2001
TECHNOLOGIES
I. Textiles Competing Predec. Concen. Comp. Predec.
1. Fraction of spindles that are ring spindles Yes No
II. Steel
2. Tons of steel produced with Bessemer over GDP No No
3. Tons of steel produced with Open Hearth over GDP Yes Yes
4. Tons of steel produced with Blast Oxygen over GDP Yes Yes
5. Tons of steel produced with Electric Arc over GDP No No
III. Telecommunications
6. (Log.) Telegrams per capita No No
7. (Log.) Telephones per capita Yes Yes
8. (Log.) Mobile phones per capita Yes Yes
IV. Mass communication
9. (Log.) Newspapers per capita No No
10. (Log.) Radios per capita Yes No
11. (Log.) TV’s per capita Yes No
V. Information technology
12. (Log.) Personal computers per capita No No
13. (Log.) Industrial robots over GDP No No
VI. Transportation
14. (Log.) Freight traﬃc on railways (TKMs) over GDP21  Yes/No Yes/No
15. (Log.) Passenger traﬃc on railways (PKMs) over GDP No No
16. (Log.) Trucks per unit of real GDP Yes Yes
17. (Log.) Passenger cars over GDP Yes Yes
18. (Log.) Aviation cargo (TKMs) over GDP Yes Yes
19. (Log.) Aviation passengers (PKMs) per capita Yes Yes
VII. Merchant shipping
20. Share of steam and motorships in merchant ﬂeet tonnage Yes Yes
COUNTRIES
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
21 Yes where canals are available. No, otherwise.Table 4: Technological distance between technologies and predecessors
New Technology Previous Technology
Vertical Horizontal Reference
Textiles
Ring Spindles Mule Spindles Avg. Speed: Mules 9.6, Ring 8.9 Saxonhouse and Wright [2000]
Steel
Bessemer Crucible Steel Increase in output per worker by a factor of over 500000 Fisher [1963]
Open Hearth Bessemer Increases productivity by less than 2.5-fold Adams and Dirlam [1966]
Blast Oxygen Open Hearth Increases productivity by 2.5-fold Adams and Dirlam [1966]
Electric Arc Produces Stainless Steel
Telecommunications
Telegrams Mail time elapsed reduced 3000-fold, cost 100-fold Sichel [1997]
Telephone Telegrams avg. time spent in three tasks decline by a factor of 3 Solymar [1999], Coe [1995],Casson [2004]
Mobile Phones Telephone increases productivy by one third Gallup [1993]
Mass Communication
Newspapers -
Radios Newspapers Worse recall rate than Newspapers Transmits sound
TV's Radios Recall rate 30% better than radio Transmits image
Information Technology
PC's Typewriters / Calculators / Mainframes Fast & Complex Computations
Robots Manual Labor Increase productivity by up to 560% Flexible Manufacturing Ayres and Miller [1983]
Transportation
Railways (Freight) Canals/Wagons With respect to wagons: Speed increases five-fold / Freight transported incr.>100-fold  Oliver [1956], Locklin [1852]
With respect to canals: Speed and productivity increase twoor three-fold Fogel [1964], Stover [1997]
Railways (Passangers) Horse Transportation Speed increases 10-fold Oliver [1956]
Trucks Railways Not a substantial increase in speed / modest reduction in cost in short distances Warner [1962]
Cars Railways Not a substantial increase in speed  Oliver [1956]
Planes (Cargo) Trucks / Railways Increases speed<4-fold, cost increases  Oliver [1956]
Planes (Passangers) Cars / Railways Increases speed<4-fold, cost increases  Oliver [1956]
Steam and Motor Ships Sail Ships 20 percent faster by 1893 Oliver [1956]
Notes: Shaded Technologies do not have competing predecessors. Freight transportation has a competing predecessor only in those countries where canals were available.
Technological Distance
Hooper [1969], Wells and Hakanen [1997]Table 5: Size of Fixed costs of Predecessor Technology When Predecessor Technology is Competing
New Technology Previous Technology Fixed Costs of Predecessor tech.
Textiles
Ring Spindles Mule Spindles Small
Steel
Open Hearth Bessemer Large
Blast Oxygen Open Hearth Large
Telecommunications
Telephone Telegrams Large





Railways (Freight) Canals Large
Trucks Railways Large
Cars Railways Large
Planes (Cargo) Trucks / Railways Large
Planes (Passangers) Cars / Railways Large
Steam and Motor Ships Sail Ships LargeTable 6: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Number Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Technologies with competing preferences 2280 -2.57 3.83 -15.42 6.75
Technologies without competing preferences 1456 -3.64 2.74 -16.68 2.10
Technologies with concentrated, competing predecessor 1866 -3.56 3.13 -15.42 3.12
Technologies without concentrated, competing predecessor 1870 -2.41 3.73 -16.68 6.75
Legislative Flexibility 12581 2.38 0.94 0.00 3.00
ln(GDP) per capita 9652 1.37 0.76 -0.35 3.22
Military Regime 18469 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
ln(MWHR) 5579 -1.91 1.32 -7.08 0.54
Judicial Effect 16863 9.02 1.41 5.50 10.00
Democracy 10452 7.10 3.37 1.00 10.00
ln(Area) 18469 5.40 1.85 1.10 9.21
ln(Population) 8611 9.18 1.37 3.50 12.50
ln(GDP) 8350 10.60 1.71 3.91 15.72
Prim. Enr. before 1970 7027 0.65 0.18 0.14 1.15
Sec. Enr. before 1970 6859 0.18 0.20 0.01 1.08
Prim. Enr. after 1970 1633 1.02 0.08 0.80 1.29
Sec. Enr. After 1970 1589 0.92 0.19 0.37 1.53Variable I II III IV V
Controls (Xct)
ln(GDP/Pop) 1.05 1.10 1.09 1.08 0.97
(16.12) (15.26) (14.69) (14.60) (12.20)
Prim. Enr. before 1970 1.44 1.50 1.52 1.54 1.64
(8.41) (8.17) (8.16) (8.45) (9.03)
Sec. Enr. before 1970 0.11 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.10
(0.07) (1.09) (1.18) (1.16) (0.61)
Prim. Enr. after 1970  0.25 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.65
(0.47) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (1.08)
Sec. Enr. after 1970 -0.41 -0.35 -0.38 -0.37 -0.66
(-1.48) (-1.25) (-1.35) (-1.32) (-2.27)
ln(electricity production) 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.17
(8.70) (8.41) (8.46) (8.43) (6.42)
Institutions
Democracy -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 -0.11
(-5.12) (-5.15) (-4.48) (-4.19)
Military Regime 0.31 0.33 0.29
(1.79) (2.18) (1.67)





Democracy * Incumb. Tech 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.13
(8.47) (8.16) (5.06) (3.95)
Mil. Reg. * Incumb. Tech -0.71 -0.82 -1.00
(-2.77) (-3.11) (-3.43)
Legislat. Flex. * Incumb. Tech -0.22 -0.32
(-2.15) (-2.67)
Judicial. Eff. * Incumb. Tech 0.07
(2.06)
No. of Obs 2648 2452 2452 2452 2452
R
2 (within) 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis computed using robust standard errors. 
All regressions include a full set of technology-year fixed effects.
Table 7: Dependent Variable: Technology Diffusion (yict)Variable I II III IV
Controls (Xct)
ln(GDP/Pop) 1.10 1.09 1.08 0.97
(15.24) (14.59) (14.51) (12.16)
Prim. Enr. before 1970 1.47 1.49 1.51 1.61
(8.03) (8.11) (8.30) (8.93)
Sec. Enr. before 1970 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.10
(1.10) (1.23) (1.20) (0.59)
Prim. Enr. after 1970  0.25 0.23 0.22 0.57
(0.43) (0.40) (0.38) (0.96)
Sec. Enr. after 1970 -0.35 -0.36 -0.36 -0.65
(-1.23) (-1.27) (-1.26) (-2.20)
ln(electricity production) 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.17
(8.53) (8.56) (8.56) (6.44)
Institutions
Democracy -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 -0.10
(-4.53) (-4.57) (-4.68) (-4.40)
Military Regime 0.12 0.18 0.16
(0.76) (1.26) (1.00)




Institut * Concen. Pred.
Democracy * Concen. Pred. 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.12
(7.79) (7.44) (5.22) (3.86)
Mil. Reg. * Concen. Pred. -0.51 -0.64 -0.88
(-1.83) (-2.30) (-2.97)
Legislat. Flex. * Concen. Pred. -0.22 -0.35
(-2.36) (-3.14)
Judicial. Eff. * Concen. Pred. 0.08
(2.71)
No. of Obs 2452 2452 2452 2452
R
2 (within) 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis computed using robust standard errors. 
All regressions include a full set of technology-year fixed effects.
Table 8: Dependent Variable: Technology Diffusion (yict)Variable I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Lagged Institut * Incumb. Tech.
Lagged Democracy * Incumb. Tech. 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.07
(4.29) (2.37) (2.71) (7.83)
Lagged Mil. Reg. * Incumb. Tech. -1.19 -1.19 -1.19 -0.45
(-4.16) (-3.55) (-2.80) (-5.58)
Lagged Legislat. Flex. * Incumb. Tech. -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.11
(-3.01) (-1.95) (-1.96) (-3.20)
Lagged Judicial. Eff. * Incumb. Tech. 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.06
(2.93) (1.44) (1.63) (5.16)
Lagged Institut * Concen. Pred.
Lagged Democracy * Concen. Pred. 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.07
(4.52) (2.41) (2.90) (6.54)
Lagged Mil. Reg. * Concen. Pred. -1.09 -1.09 -1.09 -0.40
(-3.72) (-2.72) (-2.51) (-5.16)
Lagged Legislat. Flex. * Concen. Pred. -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.11
(-3.63) (-2.49) (-2.55) (-3.21)
Lagged Judicial. Eff. * Concen. Pred. 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07
(3.25) (1.48) (1.87) (6.11)
Error Term
Cluster No No Country Country Tech-Coun Tech-Coun Tech-Coun Tech-Coun
Serial Correlation No No No No No No Yes Yes
No. of obs 2427 2427 2427 2427 2427 2427 2411 2411
R
2 (within) 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 --
Note: t-statistics computed using robust standad errors in parenthesis. All regressions control for income per capita, 
enrollment in primary and secondary education and electricity production. All regressions include a full set of technology-country fixed effects.
Columns III and IV cluster the error terms at the country level. Columns V and VI cluster the error terms at the technology-country level. 
Columns VII and VIII allow for heteroskedastic errors with a different AR(1) process for the errors terms in each technology-country cluster.
Table 9: Dependent Variable: Technology Diffusion (yict)Variable I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Controls * Incumb. Tech.
ln(GDP/Pop) * Incumb. Tech 0.24
(1.41)
Prim. Enr. 70-* Incumb. Tech 0.15
(0.36)
Sec. Enr. 70-* Incumb. Tech 1.36
(3.21)
Prim. Enr. 70+* Incumb. Tech -0.58
(-0.37)
Sec. Enr. 70+* Incumb. Tech 0.88
(1.36)
ln(electricity)* Incumb. Tech 0.03
(0.56)
ln(Area) * Incumb. Tech   0.14
 (3.79)
ln(Population) * Incumb. Tech   -0.13
 (-3.44)
ln(GDP) * Incumb. Tech -0.04
(-1.22)
Institut* Incumb. Tech.
Lagged Democracy * Incumb. Tech 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.05
(4.29) (4.63) (3.58) (2.57) (3.84) (4.10) (3.44) (1.27)
Lagged Legislat. Flex. * Incumb. Tech -0.35 -0.64 -0.31 -0.41 -0.51 -0.40 -0.27 -0.36
(-3.01) (-4.28) (-2.33) (-2.31) (-2.88) (-3.41) (-2.03) (-2.39)
Lagged Mil. Reg. * Incumb. Tech -1.19 -1.48 -1.13 -1.49 -1.58 -1.14 -0.89 -0.49
(-4.16) (-5.04) (-3.50) (-3.88) (-4.17) (-3.86) (-2.69) (-1.45)
Lagged Judicial. Eff. * Incumb. Tech 0.09 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.04 -
(2.93) (4.23) (0.43) (4.35) (3.93) (3.14) (1.07)  
Dummies
Country Dummies No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country Dummies * Incumb. Tech. No No No No No No Yes Yes
Sector Dummies* Institutional Var. No Yes No No No No No No
No. of obs 2427 2427 2427 2210 2210 2427 2427 2427
R
2 (within) 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.21 0.19 0.28 0.28 0.32
Note: t-statistics computed using robust standad errors in parenthesis. All regressions include a full set of technology-country fixed effects. 
All regressions control for income per capita, enrollment in primary and secondary education and electricity production. 
Regression III controls in addition for ln(area) and for ln(population). Regression IV controls in addition for ln(GDP).
Table 10: Robustness: Technology Diffusion with and without Incumbent TechnologiesVariable I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Controls * Concen. Pred.
ln(GDP/Pop) * Concen. Pred 0.15
(1.00)
Prim. Enr. 70-* Concen. Pred 0.60
(1.73)
Sec. Enr. 70-* Concen. Pred 0.51
(1.54)
Prim. Enr. 70+* Concen. Pred 0.08
(0.07)
Sec. Enr. 70+* Concen. Pred 0.13
(0.21)
ln(electricity)* Concen. Pred 0.03
(0.69)
ln(Area) * Concen. Pred   0.14
 (4.95)
ln(Population) * Concen. Pred   -0.16
 (-5.12)
ln(GDP) * Concen. Pred -0.06
(-2.42)
Institut* Concen. Pred.
Lagged Democracy * Concen. Pred 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.06
(4.52) (4.63) (3.65) (2.66) (4.03) (4.23) (3.40) (1.77)
Lagged Legislat. Flex. * Concen. Pred -0.40 -0.64 -0.43 -0.31 -0.42 -0.43 -0.37 -0.38
(-3.63) (-4.28) (-3.42) (-1.96) (-2.61) (-3.90) (-2.92) (-2.94)
Lagged Mil. Reg. * Concen. Pred -1.09 -1.48 -1.06 -1.36 -1.47 -1.11 -0.83 -0.62
(-3.72) (-5.04) (-3.30) (-3.44) (-3.74) (-3.72) (-2.41) (-1.81)
Lagged Judicial. Eff. * Concen. Pred 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.07 -
(3.25) (4.23) (1.37) (4.81) (4.34) (3.48) (1.74)  
Dummies
Country Dummies No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country Dummies * Concen. Pred. No No No No No No Yes Yes
Sector Dummies*Institutional Var. No Yes No No No No No No
No. of obs 2427 2427 2427 2210 2210 2427 2427 2427
R
2 (within) 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.28 0.28 0.31
Note: t-statistics computed using robust standad errors in parenthesis. All regressions include a full set of technology-country fixed effects. 
All regressions control for income per capita, enrollment in primary and secondary education and electricity production. 
Regression III controls in addition for ln(area) and for ln(population). Regression IV controls in addition for ln(GDP).
Table 11: Robustness: Technology Diffusion with and without Competing and Concentrated PredecessorsTable A1: The Cost of Constructing Canals
Name Country Cost Length Construction Period
Erie US 7 Mill. $ 584 Km 1817-25
Chesapeake and Delaware  US 2.5 Mill $ 22.4 Km 1804-28
Rideau Canada £ 822,000 200 Km 1812-32
Regent UK £ 772,000 182 Km 1812-20
Rhone-Rhine France 28 Mill. F.F. 350 Km -1834
Somme France 13 Mill. F.F. 161 Km 1770-1843
Ardennes France 14 Mill. F.F. 105 Km 1823-31
Oise River France 5 Mill. F.F. 138 Km -1810
Isle River France 6 Mill. F.F. 143 Km
Burgundy France 56 Mill. F.F. 242 Km -1832
Arles-Bouc France 11.5 Mill. F.F. 47 Km -1834
Brittany France 66 Mill. F.F. 518 Km -1836
Nivernais France 33 Mill. F.F. 174 Km 1784-1843
Berri France 27 Mill. F.F. 322 Km 1811-34
Loire lateral France 33 Mill. F.F. 197 Km 1827-38
Tarn River France 7 Mill. F.F. 147 Km 1667-94
Note: Cost expressed in current prices at the time of construction.Variable I II III IV
          
Institutions
Democracy -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 -0.11
(-4.19) (-4.79) (-4.40) (-4.98)
Military Regime 0.29 0.23 0.16 0.17
(1.67) (1.34) (1.00) (1.08)
Legislative Flexibility 0.04 0.12 0.14 0.13
(1.27) (1.2) (1.79) (1.76)
Judicial Effectiveness 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.05
(1.45) (1.6) (1.84) (1.8)
Institut* Technology Classification
Democracy * Technology Classification 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.13
(3.95) (4.27) (3.86) (4.05)
Mil. Reg. * Technology Classification -1.00 -0.89 -0.88 -0.89
(-3.43) (-2.98) (-2.97) (-2.94)
Legislat. Flex. * Technology Classification -0.32 -0.30 -0.35 -0.37
(-2.67) (-2.52) (-3.14) (-3.37)
Judicial. Eff. * Technology Classification 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.10
(2.06) (1.86) (2.71) (3.21)
Technology Classification Inc. Tech. Inc. Tech. Concen. Pred. Concen. Pred.
Technology Measure Baseline Per capita Baseline Per capita
No. of Obs 2452 2452 2452 2452
R
2 (within) 0.24 0.3 0.24 0.31
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis computed using robust standard errors. 
All regressions include a full set of technology-year fixed effects and the usual controls in Xct: income per capita, 
enrollment rates and electricity production.        
Inc. Tech. denotes the classification based on whether the technology has a close predecessor technology.
Concen. Predec. Denotes the classification based on whether the technology has a close and concentrated 
predecessor technology.  
Table A2: Robustness to Changes in Technology Measures